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FOREWORD
In August 2006, the U.S. Government imposed
sanctions on Russian arms sellers and producers,
Rosoboroneksport, Russia’s main arms-selling agency, and
Sukhoi, which manufactures aircraft, because of their
arms sales to Iran. Although Russian observers believe
that Washington did so because of these firms’ arms sales
to Venezuela, these sales to such dangerous states oblige
us to analyze the Russian defense export program and the
structure of its defense industry. Until now, that industry
would have collapsed without arms sales. Arms sales
thus have become the main source of its revenue until
the present and will play a key role in Russia’s ongoing
attempt to regenerate its armed forces while winning
friends and influence abroad.
Unfortunately, Russia appears to be aiming to win
friends and influence strictly among anti-American states
and cement an alliance or coalition among them. Moreover, Russia’s program of weapons exports reveals the
inner workings of its defense industry and the relationship
between state and society that is a fundamental driver
of its foreign and defense policies. Since 1991, when the
Russian Federation came into being, there have been
few, if any, attempts to look at this sector of the economy
and its relationship to the state, but the patterns revealed
here are of the utmost importance for anyone wishing to
come to terms with current Russian foreign and defense
policies. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) is pleased to present this monograph on a salient
issue in international security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph focuses on the relationships
between the state and Russia’s defense industrial
sector, particularly Rosoboroneksport (ROE), the main
state agency for arms sales. ROE is more than a seller of
weapons; rather, it has become an industrial behemoth
that is monopolizing whole sectors of this industry on
behalf of the state. Its activities reflect the fundamental
nature of the Russian state’s relationship to the economy, which increasingly is regressing to tsarist or even
Soviet models in some respects. In this respect, defense,
like energy, is a vital sector of the Russian economy
that the state intends to control directly. And the
Putin regime has implemented a conscious strategy of
increasing state control over more and more branches
of industry beyond those two sectors.
The parallels between these two sectors and the
leadership’s views of them strikingly reflect this
regression to patrimonial forms of management and
ownership. Yet, it remains unclear whether or not the
moves towards greater state control can really bring
the defense industry out of the prolonged crisis it has
endured. Because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) was in effect a military-industrial complex writ
large with a militarized economy, since 1991 this sector
consistently has failed to deliver to Russia’s forces the
needed weapons and technologies. That failure is the
root cause of the attempts by the state to take over that
sector and use ROE as a major actor in the process.
Arms sales also are a major, if not the major, source of
funding for all research and development (R&D) and
procurement.
Yet, even as arms sales revenue grows and ROE
takes over more and more of the defense sector on


behalf of the state, it is by no means clear that such
procedures can either restore the defense industrial
sector’s capability or that Russia’s arms can continue
to be competitive with those of foreign rivals. Nor is
it certain that arms sales revenues can keep growing,
for it appears that those sales may soon reach a plateau
as India opens up its weapons market to Russia’s
competitors, and China’s technological capability
improves. At the same time, ROE is a key player in
a foreign and defense policy that is increasingly antiAmerican and anti-capitalist, or anti-liberal. ROE and
the progress of the defense sector as a whole, therefore,
are key indicators of the continuing trajectory of both
Russian domestic and foreign policies, including
defense policy.
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ROSOBORONEKSPORT:
ARMS SALES AND THE STRUCTURE
OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Introduction.
Russia’s regression to an authoritarian, even
autocratic, system, a so-called “managed democracy”
or, more recently, “sovereign democracy,” is an
established and recognized fact. Not accidentally,
this regression has also gone hand in hand with an
increasingly adversarial policy towards the United
States. One element of this adversarial policy is the
conspicuous sale of weapons to states who are openly or
potentially anti-American, e.g., Venezuela, Iran, Syria,
and perhaps even China. Russia makes these sales in
order to strike at U.S. interests while simultaneously
advancing its own interests, which include obtaining
a foothold in the target states’ defense and foreign
policies and acquisition of revenues along with market
share from these defense sales. Therefore its antiAmerican policy thrust is by no means the only reason
for such arms sales.
Until now, precisely because the state would not
or could not procure sufficient weapons for its armed
forces, the defense industry could not survive without
exports and the revenue gained thereby. This point
holds true across the board except for firms that are
classified as strategic and which therefore are being
subsidized fully.1 But even those firms labeled as
strategic need to export in order to gain foreign
revenue (apart from the government’s other foreign
and defense policy gains) and to continue funding
research and development (R&D) and the development



of newer, more modern weapons, as well as their
serial production. So while this anti-American motive
certainly figures in those transactions, other and
deeper motives relating to Russia’s political-economic
structure are at work in this sector.
Arms sales policies and the organization of defense
industry in all states link together both domestic and
foreign policy interests and processes. In other words,
study of Russia’s defense industry not only points to
the states targeted by Moscow as potential buyers of
its weapons, it also illuminates key aspects of Russia’s
regression to autocracy, i.e., its domestic political
economy. Hence the study of the structures of these
particular organizations provides considerable insight
into the overall organization of Russian defense
industry, defense and foreign policy, and overall
political economy.
While the foreign policy interests involved in the
selling to these aforementioned states seem relatively
easy to understand, there has been little, if any, study of
the domestic organization of Russian defense industry
in the last few years by Western authors or published
in Western journals and books.2 This neglect is undeserved not only because the Russian government has
made major efforts at reforming this sector, but also
because the issues and structures involved in those sales
are self-evidently important for international security.
And as Russia’s defense machine revives, thanks to the
infusion of cash derived from the sale of oil and gas,
the nature and direction of Russian defense industrial
policy and arms sales also become considerably more
topical. It certainly is not coincidental that the revival
of arms sales to states antagonistic to the United
States has accompanied the accelerating regression to
autocracy in Russia.



For this reason, this monograph focuses on the
domestic role of ROE, Russia’s main arms sales
organization, in Russia’s politics and economics. While
obviously this is only one part of ROE’s story, this aspect
of ROE and of defense industrial policy offers analysts
the possibility of obtaining vital insights into Russia’s
overall political economy and national security policy.
One could with some justice call the lobbies and
bureaucratic factions that are active in this sphere of
Russian policy (including the relationship between
them and policymakers) a military-industrial complex
(MIC). However, with regard to Russia, that term is
somewhat simplistic, or even misleading. For example,
the Soviet Union, as we have long known, did not
have an MIC, rather it was one. It was a mobilization
economy built in the expectation of an ultimate major
war and subordinated to that expectation. Thus its
defining quality was its structural militarization.3
Contemporary Russian firms and state organizations
active in defense industry and arms sales originated
in that system and bear the marks of that origin as
bureaucratic state agencies in their continuing closeness to the state, even as they have evolved through 15
years of convulsive, unending, and visibly unsuccessful
changes. Accordingly, this monograph concerns itself
with the relationship of ROE, the key arms sales
organization, to the state, to defense industrial policy,
and to defense industry. These relationships reveal
much that is important, if not crucial, to understanding
Russia’s politics and economics.
Much if not all of Russian politics, especially in
the defense industrial sector, is bureaucratic politics,
i.e., rivalries between competing factions and lobbies
within increasingly state-directed or coordinated
bureaucracies for favor, resources, and political



turf bestowed from above. It follows that ROE’s
relationship to them is the subject of unceasing and
vigorous bureaucratic rivalry and interest. Due to
these rivalries, and to the ever more visibly statist and
controlling ideology that animates the current Russian
political leadership, ROE increasingly oversees not just
arms sales but also the whole defense industrial sector,
as well as a rising share of civilian industry. Thus, a
recent report observed that:
Russia’s arms export agency is seeking partial control in
every new major industrial conglomerate, a move seen
by analysts as part of a Kremlin drive to increase its sway
over strategic and lucrative economic sectors.4

Not surprisingly, Maxim Pyadushkin, editor of
Russia/CIS Observer, described this process as a tool
for nationalizing the sectors that the Kremlin seeks
to control: aviation, shipbuilding, metals, machine
building, arms production, and, we might add, energy.5
Consequently, control of ROE, its subordinate agencies,
and industrial firms is truly a mouth-watering prize
and thus the object of much bureaucratic wrangling
and maneuvering.
The Argument of This Monograph.
The argument here is, first, that ROE epitomizes
much of the unique Russian state supervision of
industry as a whole, not just the defense industry. This
applies to both tsarist and Soviet models of industrial
and political organization. And if a wholesale
nationalization of key sectors is occurring, that only
further reinforces the argument. And since ROE and
other vertically integrated defense firms or holding
companies are intruding ever more deeply into civilian


sectors like the automobile and truck industries, as well
as those noted above, this is not a far-fetched claim.6
Indeed, many dilemmas traditionally characteristic of
the defense industrial sector have begun to pervade
the entire economy.
Second, this organization of state control represents
the recrudescence of the tsarist or neo-Muscovite
patrimony that survived both tsarism and the Soviet
epoch where it reappeared.7 In this model, the state
owns at least the commanding heights of economic
life, if not the entire territory as its patrimony (Votchina
in early tsarist times). In fact, as Grigory Yavlinksy
recently reiterated, the entire economy operates within
a system of informal, shadow relationships, including
a vast, equally informal government that must control
or own all property through control over resources
and the judiciary. Hence property rights are either
nonexistent or at best conditional upon service to the
state. And since secure property rights do not exist
except on paper, or only for those enterprises too small
to be of major political concern, or whose owners have
submitted entirely to the state for now, the “Tsar” and
his subordinates have latitude to engage in a habitual
reapportionment of assets in order to create a new class
of servitors.8 The parameters and content of acceptable
corporate behavior in such a relationship are defined
largely by the state, not the firm in question.
The Tsarist or Patrimonial Model.
Ownership here means stewardship rather than
having legal title as understood in the West, and is
always subject to revocation at the whim of the “Tsar,”
President, or his designated servitors. Certainly
President Vladimir Putin has not hesitated to invoke



the “social responsibility” of business in partnership
with (i.e., subordination to) the state.9 For example, ROE
seized control of AvtoVaz, the automobile firm, aided
by 300 armed policemen and trumped up tax evasion
charges, actions that resemble the nationalization of
Yukos.10
Such examples of state takeover in fact epitomize
many of the processes of the economy which the
Russian economist, Vladimir Mau, describes as a kind
of reincarnation of the New Economic Policy (NEP),
launched by Vladimir Lenin in 1921 and terminated
by Joseph Stalin in 1928-29.11 Others, like Pyadushkin,
see a creeping nationalization instead of a NEP, but
the similarities are strong enough to submerge the
differences, given the strength of the state-owned
sector.12 According to Mau, as the state takes over
more and more of the key strategic sectors, private
ownership is obliged to sell out. At the same time, the
state retreats from owning petty or small businesses
of a “nonstrategic” nature, or it devolves ownership
into subfederal governmental units.13 However, the
moves by ROE and Gazprom into the automotive
industry and other civilian sectors like banking
suggest that the state’s appetite is growing in tandem
with its eating. Now, even the shipbuilding industry
is being nationalized.14 Therefore, it is likely that the
state will continue taking over formerly privatelyowned businesses in what it deems to be “strategic”
sectors—a designation that includes ever more of the
vital productive sectors of the economy—and then
turn them over to the management and control of state
bureaucrats loyal to the regime in order to consolidate
state control.
Indeed, all such “stewards” are servitors of the
regime who are granted control over these properties as



a reward for service and allowed to enrich themselves
through corruption and rent-seeking for the duration
of their tenure. “Rent-seeking” here means that people
who are placed in a position where they have control
over assets are able to appropriate the proceeds or
rents from those assets to their private use without
developing the property in question through a strategy
of optimal investments. For example, ROE makes a 3.8
percent commission on all arms sales. It is well-known
that, for both Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir
Putin, the arms sales organization served as a slush
fund by means of which unaccountable funds went
straight to the President for unspecified political
purposes.15 Thus those funds and commissions are
merely among the more visible examples of the rents
accruing to key state players from the sale of weapons
abroad. It is also the case that many of the funds that
accrue personally to Sergei Chemezov, the director of
ROE, and his key subordinates are equally untraceable.
In return, these servitors must carry out policies made
atop the government machine.
These servitors are thus rent-seeking elites who
maneuver to obtain exclusive and unaccountable
control of the rents accruing from the properties under
their control—in this case, defense industries. The sale
of their products, the ensuing commissions, and the
kickbacks generated during negotiations for arms sales
represent rents that the state grants them in return for
service. Therefore the government is a rent-granting
state.16 It, not the servitors, “owns” these industries or
can use force majeure to seize and then allocate such
assets as it sees fit to functionaries of its choice.
Indeed, government spokesmen occasionally admit
to what is going on. Vladislav Surkov, President Putin’s
chief ideologue and Deputy Head of his Presidential



administration, told the press that the heads of these
state-run companies “serve the state and will not
become an independent political force.”17 Moreover,
he went on to observe that,
These people are changeable. When the country’s
leadership changes, and other political forces come to
power, they will probably change these people. I do not
see any problem with this. . . . This is normal. . . . These
people are here today, gone tomorrrow. They serve,
they are not owners. So they cannot pose any political
threat.18

Thus private owners of defense firms, as is the case
in other strategic sectors like energy, are increasingly
being displaced by state control and managers, often
from the so-called power agencies (Siloviki). These
managers are not just the firm’s CEOs and Chief
Operating Officers (COO), they can also be the Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) and members of the Board
of Directors of the firm.19 It is as if Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld were a member of LockheedMartin’s Board of Directors. This trend is accelerating
throughout the entire Russian economy.20 The ability of
these “managers” to control these firms and appropriate
the rewards accruing to themselves from this service
depends upon their success in meeting state goals
and maximizing state control, not legislative or legal
accountability.
Equally important, the government welcomes the
Siloviki’s intervention in the economy. In January 2005,
Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov stated that,
We still need the FSB’s role in providing the government
and executive power bodies with up-to-the-minute
information that will help us provide an effective
legal foundation, make decisions on equal competition



conditions, develop business, and create a favorable
investment environment.21

Moreover, as the noted defense analyst Aleksandr’
Golts told Ekho Moskvy radio station,
It would be a mistake to assume that AvtoVaz will be
involved in export of arms and military hardware. In
my opinion, the essence of the issue lies somewhere else,
Rosoboroneksport is a state-owned company which
has, for several reasons, always recruited people from
foreign intelligence [political and economic] and Main
Intelligence Directorate [military intelligence] and
nurtured them as the most valuable cadres. Besides, this
company is characterized by absolute secrecy. It seems
that such [a] form of management has been appproved
by somebody at the top [of the government] as a highly
efficient one. And now it will be introduced in all the
businesses controlled by the state.22

Chemezov, another colleague of Putin from his
KGB days in Germany, says the major aim of this
“nationalization” is to ensure that Russian firms fulfill
their export contracts: “If there is no possibility of
monitoring the process of contract fulfillment from
the inside, it will be hard to control the quality of the
end product.”23 The idea that the market or contract
law enforced by courts might ensure this fulfillment
apparently seems to have escaped Chemezov and his
masters.
Other officials like Arkady Dvorkovich, Putin’s
Economic Advisor, justify this trend towards
nationalization or state control on the grounds that,
This is because the period we are living in [is] the transitional period from one model of economic development
to another. The companies would be expected to adhere
to standards of efficiency and transparency associated
with privately run corporations.24


Since this rationalization flies in the face of everything
we know about economics and Russia, one wonders
whether Dvorkovich is trying to deceive himself or
us.
Energy as a Model Strategic Sector.
The system now taking shape in defense industry
as a whole, and with regard to ROE in particular,
resembles the structure that is already discernible in
the energy sector. In both these cases, which from the
state’s viewpoint are the dominant strategic sectors of
the economy, Russia is building a system where single
bureaucratic giants or nominally private firms, made
up of bureaucrats who control the board of directors,
are organizing giant vertically integrated firms for each
branch of the industry. They then use that leverage
to take over other industries and place them under
state control. AvtoVaz and the trucking industry firm,
KamAz, are merely the latest such examples.25 Even if
ownership is nominally private, real control over these
firms belongs to bureaucrats appointed by the state
who view the positions given to them not just as a
means of serving the state and of implementing policy,
but also as a springboard to wealth and/or power.
Thus tough bureaucratic rivalries invariably break out
over the disposition of these “assets.”
That the regime sees the defense sector as being
comparable to the energy sector in its strategic
importance for Russia cannot be questioned. The
similarities with the energy sector are striking. For
instance, President Putin has stated that, “in terms of
its significance and scope the global weapons market
is comparable with such segments of the global
economy as energy and food. Competition here is
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extremely strong.”26 Moreover, he also stated that
the strengthening of Russia’s economic and political
position in the world—his chief objective—”depends
directly on the effectiveness of the work in the sphere
of military-technical cooperation.”27 And, of course, the
revenues from such cooperation go directly to military
modernization.28
Furthermore, in the energy sector we see that stateowned and state-run firms are increasingly inefficient,
show low growth rates, and are, if anything, inhibiting
economic growth. Gazprom, for example, is an outstanding example of that trend.29 So we can probably
expect similar trends of suboptimal economic activity
from the defense industrial sector due to its growing
takeover and control by the state. Centralization and
state ownership, touted as necessary economic reforms,
are, in fact, exactly the opposite of what are needed
from an economic point of view. Stagnation is the most
likely result in the energy industry. Such trends are
even more likely in the defense industrial sector, for, as
one commentator put it, that sector “remains the most
problem-ridden, closed, and bureaucratized sector of
our economy. Not one of the many programs designed
to reform it has thus far yielded any results.”30
Ironically, even high officials, e.g., Gherman Gref,
the Minister of Economic Development and Trade, understand this but nevertheless paradoxically continue
the suboptimizing economic policies of state takeover
and centralization. The newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(The Independent Newspaper), reported the observation
of a high-ranking official in these words:
The economic policy is now mainly geared toward
increasing the state sector. An attempt is [also] being
made to ensure an increase in economic growth rates.
“On the one hand, it is correct, for it is necessary to build
facilities comprising the infrastructure and thus create
11

conditions for the development of business. On the other
hand, state expenditures, particularly in the investment
sphere, are not always efficient, and it may happen
that the more money is distributed by functionaries,
the higher the level of corruption,” our source stated.
He is convinced that it is inexpedient to increase the
state sector of the economy. Budget investments, as a
rule, are not highly efficient. Besides, the authorities,
in essence, are driving themselves into a vicious circle.
On the one hand, . . . the task is set in the context of the
privatization program to reduce—by 2008-2009—the
amount of property controlled by the state to a minimum
required to produce state functions. At the same time,
we are currently “actively developing the state sector
by increasing the state’s stakes in joint stock companies,
but we experience problems in managing these stakes.
Instead of increasing the state sector’s effectiveness we
are expanding the sector itself.” If the situation persists,
any reduction of the state sector in the coming years will
be out of the question.31

Yet this “dialectical” policy whereby the state
chases itself, as it were, continues with no letup, as
the example of AvtoVaz indicates.32 Certainly state
officials, even those who understand the absurdity of
what they are doing, continue to proclaim that only
“state investment,” their preferred term for the process,
can rescue Russia.33 For example, Gazprom, like ROE,
is buying up automobile firms and placing them under
its control, which means state control.34 Similarly,
in September 2004 the government announced the
takeover of Rosneft by Gazprom. When Yukos was
taken over shortly thereafter by Rosneft, which itself
was already earmarked for assimilation into Gazprom,
this sequence of policies revealed Putin’s ambition
to create companies which would be the Russian
equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s Aramco.35 Since then,
Gazprom has also moved to take control of Russia’s
electricity and nuclear energy industries.36 Thus,
12

A Russian political analyst even suggested that the
merger between Gazprom and Rosneft would only be the
starting point of the establishment of the biggest energy
company in the world. The analyst pointed out a kind
of holdings company named “Gosneftgaz” composed
of Gazprom, Rosneft, Surgunteftgaz, Lukoil, Yukos, and
Sibneft could be established before the end of President
Putin’s second term, that is, 2008.37

Putin’s ideas about the proper organization of
the energy industry, which he and his colleagues
openly regard as a strategic industry, consciously
point in the direction of this suboptimizing and
economically opaque neo-Muscovite model. No doubt
these ideas also apply to the defense sector. Putin wrote
in his graduate thesis and subsequently published
articles that “regardless of whose property the natural
resources and in particular the mineral resources might
be, the state has the right to regulate the process of their
development and use.”38 His May 2006 presidential
speech to the Federal Assembly echoed the theme
that businessmen’s profits exist at the sufferance of
the state.39 Then there is his corollary view that, due to
the chaos of the 1990s, the state must reassert control
of those resources because it alone has the capacity
to ensure a rational use of resources for the national
interest.40 Putin underscored the critical importance of
control over energy, not just to the economy’s revival
but also to Russia’s survival:
The basic strategic tasks for the natural resource bloc
involve achieving the transition to a rational combination
of administrative and economic methods of government
regulation in the sphere of resource exploitation. . . . In
terms of a general conclusion, it follows that existing
socio-economic conditions, and also the strategy for
Russia’s exit from the deep crisis and the restoration
of her former power on a qualitatively new basis,

13

demonstrate that conditions in the natural resource
complex remain the most important factor in the state’s
near-term development.41

Indeed, not only is the energy complex the guarantor
of economic development and a locomotive of overall
industrial development (an argument Putin and his
supporters have also made about the defense sector and
evidently still believe to be true42), but its development
ensures Russia’s recovery as a great power.43 Putin also
argued that since the entire energy sector suffers from
a shortage of investment and capital to modernize its
plant and infrastructure (just as the defense industrial
sector does), the state must create “large financialindustrial corporations” that cut across economic
sectors and which will be competitive globally. The
state-dominated and vertically integrated financialindustrial corporations must generate revenue for
moving from extraction to processing industry, help
develop exports, ensure domestic supplies, further
develop the domestic raw material base, and help the
energy sector invest in foreign firms.
These financial industrial groups will operate within
the framework provided by the state, and if they serve
the state in this way, they can expect to hold onto their
assets. From this list of tasks set for the new financial
industrial groups, it is evident that Putin views their
control of Russia’s assets as a form of guardianship from
which the management and the “owners” are free to
profit. It is also clear that Putin does not understand this
stewardship as ownership, as it often is construed in the
West, where owners have full control of their assets and
the authority to determine the direction of their firms’
development. Putin goes on to state this rather clearly:
“the state has the right to regulate the process of the
acquisition and the use of natural resources, particularly
mineral resources, independent of on whose property
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[they] are located; in this regard, the state acts in the
interests of society as a whose, as well as in the interests
of private owners whose interests conflict and who
need the help of the state organs of power to achieve a
compromise.44 (italics in original)

This dirigiste (i.e., state-directed) concept of the
energy sector embraces the entire economy. Some
might see here a plan for huge Chaebol-like vertically
integrated monopolies, as was the case in South Korea.
But, in fact, what really is happening is a regression
to the Muscovite patrimonial model, one of whose
fundamental characteristics is state ownership and the
conditioning of control of state assets on mandatory
service to the state. Indeed, Putin’s justification of state
control merely replicates tsarist and Soviet officials’
defense of their autocratic and patrimonial systems of
rule.
Similarly, Putin’s language, as well as words of
Surkov quoted above, shows that energy revenues
are a rent bestowed upon trusted servitors to direct
as long as they serve well. Not only is this the newest
incarnation of the patrimonial Muscovite system, it also
entails a retreat from global integration to an autarchic,
zero-sum concept of the energy complex (and defense
sector). Even though Putin is demanding that industries,
e.g., aircraft, be competitive with foreign firms on the
global market, not just the domestic, and attract foreign
investment, state control and ownership, accompanied
by restrictions on foreign investment, inevitably lead
to both autarchic tendencies and stagnation.45 Indeed,
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov recently conceded that
“in the military sense, Russia remains a self-contained
sovereign party.”46
Therefore it is hardly surprising that autarchic
drives and interests are increasingly being voiced
in both energy and defense industrial sectors. In his
15

address to the Federal Assembly on April 25, 2005,
Putin cited the need for legislation clearly delineating
security requirements so that Russia could attract
foreign investment, but insisted upon preemptive
control by “national [entities], including state capital,”
over defense industry and strategic natural resources.47
Similarly, the state-controlled Gazprom wants to
become “one of the largest integrated energy companies
in the world, spanning oil, gas, and electricity,” not
to mention the automotive industry.48 This rationale
for huge vertical state-run monopolies has now been
extended to the railroad system that is supplying
energy to China in advance of pipelines.49
Putin’s Chief of Staff, Sergei Sobyanin, has expressed
the view that the energy industry is a prime mover of
the broader industrial sector—an argument that, as in
the defense sector’s case, is hardly borne out by the
record.50 Similarly, Sergei Ivanov, who is very close to
Putin and his possible successor, stated in 2003 that,
The state, in my view, should not lose control over all
the strategic branches of industry. This does not mean
encroaching on their activity, but it must control them,
know the situation, and understand in what direction
these branches are developing. . . . If we do not begin
to invest significant state funds in exploration in the
next few years, we risk having to cope with serious
consequences in the coming 10-15 years. The state,
knowing the situation, can make balanced decisions
about investing funds for geological exploration in one
or another region of the country, taking into account
companies’ development plans, and then conduct open
licensing for the exploitation of these deposits. This is
something that the state must do, because in recent years
we have become convinced that private companies will
not invest in exploration work. Besides this, minerals and
resources are state property, not private. Therefore the
state has the full right to control this process and manage
it in the interest of the entire country’s development.51
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Ivanov’s remarks also echo the sentiments of his
Soviet or tsarist forebears, which would have been
about as economically justified as are his arguments.
As we have seen here, this distrust of markets and
of private enterprise typifies Russia’s previous and
current rulers.52 But their arguments make some sense if
one regards the energy and defense industry primarily
as a strategic asset through which the state regenerates
itself along with a patrimonial type economy. Certainly
Ivanov used this argument to justify the destruction of
Yukos and its owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 200305. Ivanov’s statements, along with Putin’s and those
of other officials, articulate an official consensus about
the need for state control over energy and a fortiori
over defense industry.53 For Kremlin leaders, energy
is the state’s primary strategic asset, both in terms of
domestic revenues and in terms of maximizing foreign
influence and leverage, and they will not let this
weapon slip from their control. Therefore, while the
government might permit foreign firms to buy minority
equity in Russian energy companies, it will not let any
foreign firm or government exercise influence over any
of those companies. All these points apply even more
to the defense industrial sector.
The Consequences of the Tsarist Model.
In such a system, opacity is the rule, not the
exception, and this would be so even if we were not
dealing with the naturally secretive defense sector.
Accordingly, accountability in this sector is limited at
best, and corruption and criminality are ubiquitous
throughout the entire economy.54 Thus it recently was
observed that “in Russia, corruption is the strongest
vertical structure, on which the entire state arrangement
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is based.”55 Indeed, as the Russian press and Russian
specialists like Leonid Kosals and Vitaly Shlykov often
have observed, Russia’s defense industry is riven by
corruption and even criminal violence, including
forcible seizures of companies and the murders of
executives of defense firms in the competition for
control over the rents accruing from arms sales either
to the Russian army or abroad.56
Nor is this unusual or atypical. Analogous trends
are all too discernible in the energy industries,
Russia’s most strategic assets. And this commingling,
if not integration, of criminality with state policy is not
confined to the domestic situation but is also exported
in a deliberate effort to undermine or penetrate foreign
regimes.57 So while arms sales everywhere represent
an effort to influence foreign regimes and often are
accompanied with bribes, kickbacks, and other forms
of corruption, such criminality in Russia is not an
added cost of doing business. Rather, it is intrinsic to
the system. ROE and the defense industrial sector are
not anomalies in their behavior but instead epitomize
Russia’s “political economy” and foreign relations.
Neither do these pathologies stop here. The
numerous bureaucracies and bureaucratic actors
involved in arms sale policy lend themselves to incessant bureaucratic rivalries, which preclude efficiencies
or even effectiveness in the defense and energy sectors.
In the latter, Gazprom’s declining performance speaks
for itself.58 But in the defense sector, rivalries over
control of the procurement system led to a deadlock
by 2005, whereby increasing injections of budgetary
funds failed to lead to any meaningful increase of
procurement by Russia’s own forces.59 In this struggle
between Ivanov and the leadership of the State Defense
Order Committee led by Andrei Belyaninov, Ivanov
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prevailed at the latter’s expense, putting improvement
of the quality of weapons at some risk. As one
assessment of this rivalry concluded, “In other words,
increasing the status of one department working in
the sector of the state defense order damages another
department.”60
At the same time, this form of political-economic
organization is, of course, inherently suboptimal. In
the Russian case, the lure of a state takeover of the
defense industrial sector as an ostensibly rapid and
decisive solution to its seemingly endless problems is a
continuing temptation. This remains true even though
that solution exacerbates the problems facing this sector
due to the failure to overcome the legacy deformities
inherited from the Soviet and Stalinist mobilization
economy. Indeed, since Putin’s rise to power, the
reflexive response of officialdom whenever confronted
by political-economic shortcomings invariably has
been more centralization in the presidential apparatus
itself, a typical Communist, if not tsarist, response as
well. Therefore, to understand ROE, its relation to
other state agencies and the defense industrial sector,
and its interaction with global trends and foreign
governments, is to understand not just a sector, but the
essential nature of Russia’s neo-Muscovite model.
The Overall State of the Defense Industrial Sector.
Despite 15 years of continuous reorganizations
and upheavals, Russia’s defense industry remains
a backward, crisis-ridden, unproductive sector and
is acknowledged as such by high-ranking state
officials, not just outside analysts.61 It currently works
at about 20-30 percent of its capability, depending
on the particular analysis or estimate in question.
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Its infrastructure and personnel are aging, and the
former is increasingly dilapidated. Only 20 percent of
Russian weapons are of contemporary quality, and this
depressing fact actually represents an improvement
on earlier conditions.62 Moreover, the visible and
even accelerating deterioration of the quality of those
weapons and the increasingly heroic efforts necessary
to keep them serviceable had already made their
presence felt in arms exports by 2002.63 In March 2002,
The Times of India reported that,
The Parliamentary Standing Committee had issued
recommendations last week urging the government
to avoid overdependence on Russia for armaments
and spare parts. The Committee report did reportedly
acknowledge that Russia has been and will remain a
steadfast source of defense equipment for India, but
cautioned that New Delhi’s current dependence on
Moscow for as much as 80 percent of its arms imports
is not a healthy situation. It likewise observed that
Russia was not providing military hardware on the
same beneficial financial terms that it had during the
Soviet era, and urged both that New Delhi cease making
advance payments for future weapons acquisitions from
Russia, and that it seek in the future to put more defense
contracts up for competitive tender.64

While plans are underway to engage in wholesale
reequipping of the Russian military through the
next decade, industry is still often unresponsive and
oriented toward exports that produce desperately
needed hard currency, not toward the domestic defense
community.65 Russian officials are also increasingly
insistent that Russian defense industries produce for
the domestic civilian market, much as their Soviet
predecessors did.66
Indeed, it appears that the new trend is to have
factories that work largely for the civilian sector also
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produce for the military. This, too, represents a step
back towards the Soviet model, where every plant,
including ostensibly civilian ones, were, in fact,
geared to produce for the needs of the defense sector’s
mobilization endeavors and where defense factories,
to maintain production lines, produced (generally
substandard) goods for the civilian sector.67
Hence the significance of foreign arms sales, which
are supposed to go a long way toward funding not
only the preservation of valuable arms-producing
firms, but also the entire defense industrial sector. In
2005 three goals were set for the defense industrial
sector: guaranteeing conditions for serial production
of weapons that have good prospects for use and sales;
maintaining and developing Russia’s position in the
global arms market; and diversifying production so
that the defense industrial sector produces goods that
are usable in the civilian sector (sometimes resorting
to import substitution even if that works against the
mandated autarchy of the 1970s).68 Despite a registered
account of defense sector enterprises as late as 2003,
estimates of the sector’s present size vary wildly,
ranging from 1,265 firms all the way up to 1,700.69 This
disparity in assessments of how many firms actually
make up the defense industrial sector, which according
to one official account used to include over 2,000 firms,
testifies to the endemic confusion that prevails.70
To judge the failure to get rid of Soviet-era firms,
we may compare the number of firms in this sector
reported in 2003-04—1,70071—with the figure to 2005,
which was still close to 1,700 defense firms in operation,
far more than are needed or can be sustained. After all,
25-40 percent of them are bankrupt, depending on the
particular source consulted!72 Thus, very little has been
achieved in converting this sector into a full-fledged
system of market relationships where uncompetitive
21

firms are forced out and their resources freed for
more profitable use. Many of those firms remain
uncompetitive, even those not bankrupt, as was the
case 5 to 15 years ago, and depend on state bailouts
to continue working in the defense sector.73 Worse
yet, current trends suggest a regression towards the
structural militarization of the Soviet economy and
the imposition of state controls in the neo-Muscovite
paradigm instead of reliance upon market forms of
organization.74 Indeed, recently announced plans
indicate that by 2015 Moscow hopes to be spending
4.939 trillion rubles (or $185 billion) annually on
defense.75
One key reason for this revival of the Soviet-like
structural militarization is that, as the central vehicle
for arms sales, ROE has been assigned objectives that
go far beyond supervising arms sales, embracing ever
larger responsibilities in restoring Russia’s defense
industry as a whole. To the extent that central direction
and control are strengthened, these uncompetitive and
wasteful firms probably will continue to operate or be
integrated into larger firms and drag them down too.
While economic revival remains the regime’s
principal task, its true and ultimate objective is
facilitating Russia’s revival as a great Eurasian power,
Russian leaders’ traditional goal. Putin has responded
to the defense sector’s crisis by recentralizing it—not
resovietizing—as part of his overall program. Although
rising defense spending claims the majority of the
official budget, this sector also continues to consume
vast sums of unaccounted for and unaccountable funds.
Moreover, its appetite and diet are both growing. One
account of the draft 2006 budget presented to the
Duma in 2005 made no bones about its being a budget
primarily oriented toward growth of the defense sector
and therefore quite opaque:
22

In fact, a significant part of the military budget
expenditures and the corresponding goals are hidden
under entirely civilian designations. For example, one
of the goals, whose achievement must be ensured by
corresponding state expenditures, is the growth of
machine building export. In figures, this appears as
follows: in 2005, machine building export must comprise
$14.8 billion. At the same time, arms export—and this
part of machine building export—has been placed at
$5.1 billion. For now, the fulfillment of these tasks is
not convincing: in the first half of 2005, the export of
machine building products comprised only $5.5 billion
(for reference: in the first half of 2004, $6.5 billion worth
of machines and equipment were exported, and $14.4
billion worth of analogous products were exported for
the entire year). Our Kommersant correspondent was
unable to obtain data on the semi-annual export of arms.
However, we do know that even the plan for their export
in 2005 is less than the data in the actual export of arms
in 2004 when it comprised $5.8 billion.76

Tightened state control with lessened transparency
and accountability can only perpetuate that condition.
In 2005, Vladimir Mukhin stated:
According to the roughest estimates, over one-half of
the country’s budget will come under the new militaryindustrial control. Solely in respect of direct allocation
around $16 billion will officially pass through the
Russian Federation Defense Ministry-controlled Federal
Agency for the Defense Order and Federal Agency for
Military-Technical Cooperation in 2004 (according to
Economic Development and Trade Ministry data, 341.2
billion rubles will be removed from the defense order
and R 150 Billion from the arms business). Expenditure
on special construction and military reform, as well as
on defense industry administration, must be put into
this category. However, Comptroller’s Office audits of the
military department regularly reveal the nontargeted use of
vast resources.77 (Emphasis added.)
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These moves to create an omnicompetent Ministry
of Defense also added 100,000 railroad troops to the
Ministry of Defense (MoD) rolls. Thus, as of 2005,
Ivanov’s MoD:
Includes the Russian Federation Federal Service for
Military-Technical Cooperation [FSVMC], Federal
Service for the Defense Order, and Federal Service
for Technical and Export Control, which have been
transformed from committees under the Russian
Federation Defense Ministry, plus the Federal Agency for
Special Construction. In respect of questions concerning
the nuclear defense complex, the Defense Ministry also
will control the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy,
which is part of the new Ministry of Industry and Energy.
The Russian Federal Railroad Troops Service, disbanded
by presidential edict, also has passed to the Ministry.
The department’s oversight functions extend to the
administrations for munitions, conventional weapon,
guidance and control systems, and shipbuilding, which
have been reestablished within the Industry and Energy
Ministry in place of the analogous agencies that have
been abolished.78

Since then, Ivanov and his Ministry have gained
even more control over this sector, including oversight
of ROE which is being used increasingly as a financial
and state control agency over all of defense industry.
Insiders in defense industry have hailed these
moves as a return to the past that would encourage
formation of state-led, vertically integrated, defenseindustrial complexes to produce modern weapons
and technology.79 Certainly many observers advocate
MoD control of that industry.80 Moscow also hoped
to concentrate “winners” in large blocs controlled
or at least directed by the state and to eliminate
uncompetitive enterprises.81 Indeed, Putin even placed
high-ranking state officials as directors of some firms,
a classic example of patrimonialism in action.82
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However, despite the state’s continuing failure to
reform this sector, Moscow will not let private industry
run it lest those firms fail. First Deputy Minister
of Industry, Science, and Technology Aleksandr’
Brindikov said that Russia must save even inefficient
production capabilities for future contingencies against
the possibility of wartime need.83 As Aleksandr’ Golts
wrote,
Even though Russia annually spends more and more
financial resources on arms production—thus in 2005,
government defense contracts were worth a total of 187
billion rubles—its volume is negligible. The reason is that
the industry is based on purely Soviet principles. The
Defense Ministry wants the defense industrial complex
to be ready to produce the whole spectrum of arms—
from Topol-M strategic missiles to Kalashnikov assault
rifles. Therefore it has to spread considerable financial
resources thin on the ground—to go around between all
enterprises in equal but infinitesimal shares. As a result,
for instance, this year the Russian military will receive
just a few combat aircraft—not new, but retrofitted old
models.84

Stalin’s market-defying logic and total war mobilization outlook still prevail.85 Meanwhile, the Russian
government has resorted to throwing money at
procurement with little return. According to one
account, Ivanov recently told the State Duma, “More
than 40 state and government officials sign off on the
state defense order, but no one is ultimately responsible
for its execution.”86 On hearing this, reporter Oleg
Vladykin of the Moscow Times wrote,
From the financial watchdog’s chief perspective,
continuous increases in military spending on the
procurement of arms and military equipment do not necessarily guarantee that these funds are used effectively.
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A lack of clear mechanisms for interaction between the
“power structures” and the defense industry has often
jeopardized production deadlines, quality standards,
and, most importantly, the stability of prices.87

Thus in November 2005 Ivanov had to admit that
defense allocations were falling short of needs,
with the Navy and Air Force particularly lacking in
supplies.88 Meanwhile, 70-80 percent of the armed
forces’ equipment was obsolete in the unanimous view
of commentators.
In May 2006, Ivanov told Putin that the military
would spend over 4,000 billion rubles, with other
power structures spending about 1,000 billion rubles,
on procurement of weapons for the state armament
program through 2015.89 Nominally, these figures
represent major increases over past expenditures, but,
given the results to date and what we know of statecontrolled firms’ economic performance in the past, we
are entitled to question whether Russia actually will
receive an adequate return on its defense investment.
In this connection, a recent paper by Irina Isakova
observes that the Ministry of Defense commissioned
over 400 items of equipment to make up for years
of insufficient funding, with serial production and
deliveries to the armed forces being anticipated
for 2010.90 She noted that the second reading of the
planned State Defense order for 2007 was scheduled
for June 2, 2006. Supposedly even more money was
to be allocated for defense spending so that it would
rise by 27-28 percent over the 2005 level rather than
the earlier planned 20 percent. In the Defense Order
for 2007, the ministry would spend 302.7 billion rubles,
increasing procurement by 22 percent. The ministry
would also increase spending on R&D by 20 percent
so as to reach $10 billion. Ivanov had claimed earlier
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that serial production of weapons could now begin.91
Total defense spending, according to Ivanov, therefore
would exceed $29.6 billion.92
Moreover, total spending over the projected life of
the defense order was to approach 5 trillion rubles, a
figure close to China’s projected official defense budget
for the period. The purpose behind these expenditures
is to reequip Russia’s armed forces so that they could,
in accordance with the requirement expressed by Putin
in his May 10, 2006, speech to the Federal Assembly,
wage one global war, one regional war, and several
local wars simultaneously, if need be.93 In other words,
Putin here reasserted the need for a comprehensive
mobilization of the economy on behalf of the armed
forces. The constantly rising figures, the difficulty in
monitoring what the defense sector really is spending
and buying, and the discrepancies in announced
spending totals suggest to this author a heightened
opacity in defense spending.94 Of course, such opacity
may reflect continuing bureaucratic pathologies which
are built into the system deliberately to inhibit any real
ability to trace and monitor state spending. Possibly
both factors—malfeasance and design—are at work
here.
However, the June 2, 2006, meeting alluded
to above was postponed. Its purpose was to draft
the State Defense Order and the so-called targeted
development program to increase both procurement
and the technological quality of armaments. Deputy
Head of the new Military-Industrial Commission (of
which more below) Vladislav Putilin now talked of
spending 250-400 billion rubles on that program. As
he and Ivanov both said, the government now seeks
to minimize as far as possible any time lag between
adoption of the state armaments program through 2015
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and the targeted development program for reequipping
and developing the defense industrial sector through
2015.95
At the same time, Russian arms exports, upon
which industry depends, are hitting a yearly ceiling of
about $5-6 billion, forcing industry to consider selling
nuclear-capable systems that have the downside effect
of enhancing proliferation threats facing Russia.96
Worse yet, many experts believe that the quality
problem inherent in Russian arms sales of Sovietgeneration weapons is constraining prospects for
future arms sales. While the spare parts market for
these weapons is evidently growing, the market for the
weapons themselves is declining, with both China and
India, Moscow’s main customers, increasingly looking
either to indigenous production or to the West.97
Neither do observers see any visible improvement
in actual procurement. Indeed, many experts believe
that no real research is currently taking place, including
that in vital cutting-edge fields, and that talk of new
weapons is just that, talk.98 One ferocious critic of
the armed forces, Aleksandr Khramchikin, observes
that reports of a fifth-generation aircraft were merely
speculation because there was no real competition
between Sukhoi and MiG, no blueprints, and no basis
for tenders. Even though Sukhoi won a tender and
boasts of catching up to the U.S. F-22 Raptor already
in service, by the time this is supposed to happen, 40
percent of U.S. aircraft will be unmanned.99 Current
reforms aim to replace the military’s conventional
weaponry fully by 2020-2025. Meanwhile, Russia will
focus on upgrading existing systems by adding new
technologies incrementally through 2015, particularly
the information component of weapons.100 As these
reforms occur, priority will go to funding R&D for new
weapons and to maintaining open production lines
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and capabilities for existing weapons during the same
period. Industry will use this period, or so it is planned,
to start introducing new weapons so that upgrades,
repairs, hardware development, and procurement
reach 50-60 percent of annual defense spending by
2015, thereby preserving production capabilities.101
To raise exports, Putin merged Russia’s arms
exporters, whose competition allegedly knocked down
the price of exports, into one group under his direct
authority, i.e., ROE, and gave operational control to
the MoD.102 He also cut over 600,000 mostly paper jobs
in defense industry through 2006, possibly closing
factories and even whole design groups. The aerospace
and shipbuilding industries in particular will be
concentrated drastically into state-controlled holding
companies, just like the energy sector.103
This is exactly what Ivanov has called for as he takes
even greater control of this sector.104 Some 35-40 giant
holding companies under state control supposedly
should unite the existing 1,700 defense enterprises and
eliminate laggards.105 Their nuclei will be those firms
engaged in exports. The three key groups of firms
will be those supplying finished weapon platforms
like aircraft, submarines, tanks, etc.; those supplying
weapon systems to go on those platforms; and those
supplying such auxiliary items as engines, generators,
and maintenance systems.106 While in 2001-02, many of
these plants’ production was 5-7 percent of capacity,
their level since has risen, but only to some 15-25 percent
of capacity. Ivanov also maintains that the remaining
production capacity will be used to manufacture
high-technology civilian goods, thus warding off
bankruptcy.
While he argues that this scheme is not a replication
of the Soviet system under which firms made cookware
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and weapons together, it is in fact a return to that
system.107 As Alexander Golts observes,
In speech after speech, Ivanov has been insisting that
the military-industrial complex can drive the Russian
economy. As proof, he has noted that defense industries
account for more than 70 percent of all high-tech products
and employ more than 50 percent of the country’s
scientists. Ivanov also maintains that by 2015 Russian
defense industries will devote more than 70 percent of
their production capacity to the manufacture of civilian
goods.108

If we combine these claims with the fact that ROE
is taking over part, if not all, of every new major
industrial conglomerate (as discussed earlier), then
we can perceive clearly that the state takeover of the
economy for purposes of military development—
the same overriding goal of Soviet economics—is
recurring.109 Indeed, as one of Putin’s aides admitted,
“The solutions are half-Soviet.”110 Little that we have
seen, however, gives reason to believe that the defense
sector can be the locomotive of high-technology
production, as Stalin, Putin, and now evidently Ivanov
all have maintained.
The Russian Critique of the Defense Sector.
External observers, industrialists, and high
officials like Deputy Defense Minister General Alexei
Moskovskiy all agree that defense industrial policy
has failed, barely meets military needs, or has not been
implemented. These critics highlight severe quality
shortcomings throughout the industry as well. These
critiques underscore the state’s inability to make
the neo-Soviet and neo-tsarist model work under
present conditions.111 There are many reasons for this.
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Certainly the legal environment, the tendency of ROE
to favor deals over service, and the regime’s overall
preference for putatively autarchic development,
inhibit the growth of foreign contracts and sales.
Thus Vladimir Urban reported that India proposed
in 2004 to President Putin that it was ready to begin
joint defense research work with Russia for the entire
cycle of product development. But Russian laws and
ROE’s preference for deliveries for which it receives
a commission (rent-seeking again) stood in the way
of this proposal. Likewise, post-delivery servicing is
not attractive to the defense firms who manufacture
weapons.112 In a similar vein, Israel proposed to
Russia that it cooperate with Moscow in developing
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to scout for Russian
aerial armaments platforms, even to the point of a
joint venture that would make Russian strike aircraft
significantly more attractive as a sales package. Yet
Moscow evidently prefers to go it alone, maintaining
freedom to sell its own weapons to countries like
Syria.113
A recent study by the respected Strategy and Technology Analysis Center (STAC) found that in many if
not all cases, arms sales funds never even reached the
defense-industry complex, yet this sector still survives
almost exclusively due to exports. Even though state
funding supposedly has risen by several orders of
magnitude since 1999, STAC found that this sector
still would not receive state funds in 2005 because the
state administration, despite Putin’s reforms, remains
broken. Konstantin Makiyenko, Deputy Director of
STAC, found that,
Defense agencies were abolished in the course of the state
administration reforms [2004], so defense enterprises
are no longer required to report their condition. Thus I
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don’t believe that even the government knows the true
situation in the military-industrial complex. In fact, even
the picture we’ve come up with is not complete—because
we did not assess the condition of classified producers of
strategic weapons.114

In 2003 Sergei Ivanov complained that “units have
only 70-85 percent of the required armament in working
order, and the figure is less than 20 percent for up-todate models.” He also complained about “inexpedient
acquisitions.”115 Nor is this a surprising outcome. Golts
and Tonya Putnam observe that defense spending
from 1999 to 2003 more than doubled in real terms.116
Yet readiness/procurement did not improve.117 One
anonymous deputy industrial engineer in a Moscow
defense plant wrote to the newspapers that,
We are already observing the loss of control of this entire
very complex system, uncertainty, clearly criminal
competition for purchases of weapons and the receipt of
resources for the development of new models. Already
right now the single customer [the weapons directorate
of the Ministry of Defense] is not managing the situation
in the defense industry and does not know the troops’
needs. . . .118

Another problem is that the military sets its own
funding priorities without any real civilian oversight.
Thus money disappears into untraceable “black holes.”
For example, in 2002 79 billion rubles went for 340
different types of military equipment. Yet,
In many cases . . . the orders have been for a single piece
of equipment (e.g., one tank or one airplane) rather than
for an entire series. Year after year the Defense Ministry
has paid for this piecework without any guarantee
that these weapons could be manufactured on a large
scale. Nevertheless, Russia’s 2002 armament program
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again neglected to specify any government priorities for
procurement.119

Similarly, the 2005 federal budget raised defense
and security forces’ spending 30 percent and mandated
the following procurements:
Three battalions of T-90 tanks (90 vehicle in total),
three battalions of armored transport vehicles (again 90
machines), the first battery of the Iskander-M operationaltactical missile complex (consisting of two launcher units,
two warships, two TU-160 “Blackjack” strategic bombers
(one new one to be refitted), seven modernized SU-17SM
multi-role fighter jets, seven ballistic missiles (four TopolM silo-based rockets and three on mobile launchers), nine
military satellites, and seven booster rockets. In short
the budget calls for the purchase of about 300 individual
weapons and pieces of military hardware, at a total cost
of 188 billion rubles ($6.8 billion).120

Yet, as we have seen, those targets were not reached,
leading some analysts to complain that unless funding
levels are raised, the entire armed forces may collapse
in a number of years.121 Naturally the 2006 and 2007
budgets, especially for procurement, aimed for a
further considerable increase of spending. As Vladykin
observers,
In 2006 almost 237 billion rubles (about $ 8.8 billion has
been set aside for the procurement of arms, military
hardware, and other equipment compared with 183
billion rubles (about $6.7 billion) last year. According
to Sergei Ivanov, an additional 54 billion rubles (about
$2 billion) will be spent on modern high-tech arms
for the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, as well
as—in light of the U.S. plan to deploy ABM systems in
Eastern Europe—on reinforcing Russia’s ABM system.
Projections for 2007 arms production levels were
announced recently: funding is to increase by another
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28 percent. Further modernization of the Armed Forces
will cost the state treasury 302.7 billion rubles (about $11
billion). Total defense spending is expected to reach 800
billion rubles (about $29.5 billion).122

Supposedly, 55 percent of government armament
program funds from 2007 to 2015 will be spent on new
weapons.123 However, to obtain an accurate picture,
these figures should be readjusted upwards because
the vagaries of the Russian system understate the actual
burden of defense spending on the economy (more on
this below). Nevertheless, the real issue remains not
the amount of spending, but rather its efficiency or
effectivness in providing Russia with the weapons it
needs.
Moves that point toward a restoration of the
Soviet system also naturally restore Soviet economic
pathologies such as substitution of plans and reports for
actual execution, systematic obfuscation or falsification
of statistics, and an uncompetitive, wasteful, and
inherently inflationary defense economy. Indeed,
many reports of improved procurement are evidently
just another Potemkin village.124
While the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade stated that inflation in 2004 was 12 percent, in fact
it was 29 percent, with metal prices rising even more in
2003-04, causing procurement failures and additional
costs of 50-55 billion rubles in 2003 alone. Military
producers had to absorb the difference, and many state
orders were not met.125 Similar events occurred in 2005
and undoubtedly continue to occur, given the nature
of the economy.126 As the Russian government still
cannot meet modern budgetary-industrial challenges,
and defense economic structures remain premodern
nonmarket institutions, military modernization occurs
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in a strategic and economic vacuum that cannot sustain
such projects or impose credible, hard-nosed budgetary
and policy constraints. Moreover, a neo-Soviet system
predictably invites the replication of many Soviet
pathologies as “rational” structural responses to the
distorted economic realities of the system, e.g., efforts
to deceive the state and overcharge it for inferior or
nonexistent projects.127
Defense Spending and Structural Militarization.
Defense modernization still entails excessive
economic and political costs and means, essentially
preserving or transforming Soviet structural militarization to meet current challenges but without clear
strategic guidance as to what the priority threat or
threats are.128 In fact, to read authoritative documents
like Putin’s May 10, 2006, speech to the Federal
Assembly, it would appear that the main threat is not
terrorism, but the United States and NATO, so naturally
spending will go to those contingencies.129 It is unlikely
that this Soviet-like restoration, which resembles the
endless Soviet and tsarist reorganizations to “perfect”
the state apparatus, can fulfill Russia’s weapons plans
for 2010 or 2015, modernize the defense economy, or
overcome the legacy of structural militarization.
For example, the defense industry reportedly
recovered far enough by 2003 to produce at 42 percent
of its 1990 levels, when it produced twice as many
weapons as did American defense industry. Thus
Russia produces almost as many weapons as does
America. Yet its gross national product (GNP) still
has not recovered to 1990 levels and is 15 percent of
America’s.130 As of 2004, according to Moskovskiy, it
met only 10-15 percent of the armed forces’ needs.131
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The defense industry’s condition satisfies nobody.
Ivanov complained that industry wants bailouts from
the state rather than to compete and sell on the basis
of a market, and conceded that Russia still lives off the
Soviet heritage.132
The systematic obfuscation of economic statistics
also makes it virtually impossible to obtain a clear idea of
the extent of the economy’s militarization or an accurate
understanding of defense spending. Thus estimates of
that militarization vary significantly. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London observes
that Russian defense spending through 2002, using
the regime’s formal budgetary statistics, amounts
to only about 2.5-3 percent of annual gross domestic
product (GDP).133 However, this conclusion does not
consider the widespread reliance on falsified statistics,
extra-budgetary allocations, budget add-ons like that
decreed at the end of 2004, funds under the control of
the General Staff for nonmilitary purposes, regional
and local spending on the military, and noncash
transactions.134
As a result, estimates of the true amount of defense
spending, and of the burden of defense spending on
the economy, vary, but they all do so in ways that
significantly revise upward the proportion of defense
outlays relative to Russia’s GDP and budget. Indeed,
defense spending is the largest component of the budget. Irina Isakova argues, with regard to the 2004 budget,
that national defense budget headings amounted to
2.56 percent of GDP, a figure that excludes pensions
and paramilitary forces that were funded elsewhere.
Using the IISS assessments and adding these data,
defense spending came to 680 billion rubles, or 4.05
percent of Russia’s GDP.135 She also found that in 2005
the presentation of the budget was changed so that all
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defense-related expenditures were brought under a
special section on national defense, including a special
chapter itemizing the breakdown of the state defense
order on funds for R&D, maintenance of existing
equipment, and procurement of new equipment for
both the regular and paramilitary forces. The 2006
budget removed the itemization but specified the
classified amount of funds transferred to the MoD
(183.1 billion rubles out of 297.7 billion rubles allocated
to it). All defense spending officially amounted to 666
billion rubles, again around 2.8 percent of GDP.136 Yet
this figure is not consistent with the aforementioned
procurement figures because, if it captures total defense
spending, then hardly anything is left for spending on
personnel or other needs, a result we know is patently
absurd.
Alternatively, Christopher Hill of the British Ministry
of Defence (MoD) presented figures for 2001 and 2004
concerning the continuing excessive burden of defense
spending upon the Russian economy. Hill estimated
that actual spending in 2000 was 143 billion rubles in
terms of 2000 prices, having risen significantly from
1999, with the official 2000 defense budget reflecting
little more than half of true defense spending.137 In
2001, he found that defense spending rose to $50 billion
in constant 2000 prices. IISS came in with a somewhat
higher estimate of $57 billion in constant 2000 prices.138
In 2001 the government announced its intention to
reapportion arms spending to an even 50-50 ratio
between conventional and nuclear weapons by 2011.139
Although defense spending has risen greatly since
2001, there is no reason to assume either less opacity or
a reduced defense burden compared to that year.
Hill also assumed that the military accounts for
one-third to one-half of all spending on science, but
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official statements suggest his estimate was unduly
conservative.140 Thus, as of 2001, defense spending
probably accounted for 5 percent of GNP, a high
proportion by NATO, if not past Soviet, standards.141
Hill, together with Peter Sutcliffe, argued in 2004 that
Russian defense spending remained in the 4.5-5 percentof-GDP range, that much defense spending continues
to remain off the budget or “extra-budgetary,” and
that actual spending on defense by NATO standards
of measurement in 2004 was 480 billion rubles.142
They also found that Russia could probably reach
official conscription and weapon procurement targets
by 2010.143 Ivanov’s latest reforms, described below,
confirm that prediction. Although Isakova’s and Hill’s
figures do differ somewhat, they are close. Taken
together, they show the need for not taking official
Russian declarations at face value. Russia’s actual
defense spending is considerably more than that
announced in the official budget, a fact making the
poor return on its investment even more striking.
Mikhailov insisted upon priority for systems related
to terrestrial and sea reconnaissance; information support of troops; automated weaponry combat control;
precision strike from land, sea, and air; modern global
and theater navigation; optical and radio detection,
ranging, and information processing; and new
munitions “possessing significantly greater energy
capacity, means for their delivery, and others.”160 He
outlined several key areas in which, using exclusively
domestic production, Russia must compete, given the
rising American threat: space and missile engineering
to build Topol-Ms, missile defenses, new generation of
space apparatuses “for various targeting procedures,”
aeronautical engineering for new fighter planes, antiair
or air defense engineering, 4th- and 5th-generation
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submarine missile cruisers, heavy aircraft-carrying
cruisers, precision-guided missiles, tanks, C2 systems
for ground forces, and highly integrated microprocessors, supercomputers, and neuroprocessors.161
Richard Staar reported that future defense spending
would feature major increases in aerospace systems;
microelectronics; electro-optical systems; new strategic,
tactical, and miniature nuclear weapons; the first Boreyclass nuclear submarines armed with the new SS-NX28 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Bulava); the
navy; and command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) technologies for both information
warfare and nuclear C3I.162
The program for naval spending on new ships,
originally expected to double by 2008, has gone awry.
The Navy, at least according to its proponents in 2005,
risked collapsing even though new, smaller ships
are apparently coming on line.163 According to Staar,
Russia has spent significant amounts researching
directed-energy weapons: lasers; microwave radiation
emitters; particle-beam generators using subatomic
particles to destroy targets at the speed of light; a
new mass plasma weapon that could by ionizing the
atmosphere destroy incoming enemy missiles and
aircraft; anti-stealth radar; stealthy air-launched cruise
missiles; newly tested antiaircraft and anti-missile
systems (i.e., the S-400 with a range of 250 miles); and a
plasma coating to make 5th-generation Russian aircraft
invisible.164 Until these weapons are ready—Staar’s list
omitted weapons based on discovery of new physical
principles, information weapons, C3I systems, nuclear
weapons, etc.—Russia must continue upgrading
existing systems.165
These programs reflect emerging Russian views of
future war.166 As a 2002 Swedish study observed,
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According to the Russian military doctrine, future conflicts will be characterized by, among other things, a wide
use of stand-off weapons, electronic warfare, increased
information confrontation, efforts to disorganize state
and military command and control systems, highly
efficient high-precision weapons, massive air operations,
and the use of airborne forces. Technologies to support
the development of such future forces and capabilities
are thus of highest importance.167

Russian defense industry may remain competitive
in traditionally strong sectors like nuclear, laser, and
space satellite technology. But its excessive dependence
upon the state and structural militarization makes it
inherently dysfunctional. Russia still may be falling
behind in cutting-edge innovative technologies
relevant to future wars even without considering
issues of manpower; professionalizing the armed
forces; underinvestment in education and science;
organizing the forces to maximize the potential of new
systems and technologies; and the catastrophic state of
its infrastructure.168 Consequently, the defense industry
remains in crisis despite Putin’s efforts to overcome it
by reasserting state control, a policy which, at best, will
have dubious results.169
Undoubtedly this crisis will provoke further reforms. Already the regime appears to be seeking to
channel funds from a reformed customs program
whereby the Federal Border Service has been
resubordinated to direct governmental control by the
President, not the Ministry of Economic Development
and Trade.170 Arms sales, creation of more vertically
integrated holdings in the economy, and establishment
of ruble-denominated commodity exchanges for gas,
oil, gold, and possibly other commodities will also
serve as a source of defense funding.171 In addition, the
government is sponsoring what it calls public private
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partnerships (PPP) to facilitate private investment in
defense industry. While the initial idea (as of July 2006)
is to keep control of these partnerships out of the hands
of the MoD, it still seems that attempting to sponsor
private investment in these vertically integrated and
state-controlled firms is a new variant of the old
Muscovite and Soviet practice of coercing private labor
and/or resources into state service.172
At the same time, Ivanov now urges defense
industries, not the government, to fund R&D on their
own and give weapons to the military. He resorts to these
measures because the state defense order now exceeds
the volume of exports, and production has begun to
revive. Supposedly, such an expedient eliminates
“dead souls” on the state’s ledgers, firms that produce
nothing, and also puts the onus of producing genuinely
new weapons on industry so that the military is not
stuck with Soviet weapons masquerading as new
ones.173 While it is unclear whether such reforms will
succeed, clearly the defense economy’s crisis is linked
to and reflects the state’s own abiding crisis.
This crisis apparently has reached a head since
2005. Participants in the debate over this crisis point to
under-investment by the state in defense industry (a
perennial accusation since 1991 whose partial validity
obscures the failures of industry), and to the defense
industrial sector’s concentration on exports rather
than on providing weapons to Russia’s armed forces
(an argument ignoring the fact that the armed forces
could not pay for weapons until quite recently). Under
a market economy, producers naturally would orient
production to customers who could pay for their
products.174 Others cite rising costs for steel and other
basic materials of production which forced reductions
in output because prices per weapon have increased.
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Meanwhile quality standards lag, making Russian
weapons uncompetitive abroad and reducing the
amount to be garnered from arms sales after 2007.175
Adding to this particular quandary is the fact that
both India and China, Moscow’s main customers, may
soon be less eager to buy. There are several reasons.
India and China are developing their own weapons
licensing and export capabilities based on Russian
technology transfer and will not need so many
Russian weapons. In some cases, India and China
find legitimate fault with Russian systems’ quality.
The economics of the two countries will be opened
up quite soon to much tougher foreign competition,
reducing their favorable trade balances and perhaps
leaving less surplus for foreign weapon purchases.176
Finally, China and India are forming joint enterprises
with Russia to sell Russian weapons, e.g., helicopters,
thus moving the two countries away from being net
arms purchasers.177 Thus many analysts expect Russian
arms sales to plateau in the near future.178 Moreover,
Chemezov has admitted that Russian exporters have
not succeeded in dramatically increasing the quality
of exports.179 Thus the impetus to produce for foreign
markets might reach its limit quite soon.
As the Russian economy grows along with Russia’s
military capability, the crying need to produce
modernized technologies for a force possessing only
about 20 percent of modern systems in its arsenal also
will grow. Thus Moskovskiy observed that,
While the program now in effect lays the focus on
funding retrofits and tests of new equipment, which
account for up to 40 percent of all assets allocated, the
new program to be in effect till 2015 envisages that 80
percent of all funds will be spent for mass-production
and delivery of state-of-the-art equipment and materiel
and their modernization in the interests of the armed
forces.180
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Likewise, the Ministry of Industry and Energy
is drafting an independent plan to tap the defense
industry to mass-produce products for its use and the
modernization of Russia’s strategic energy industry.181
Thus we can discern a clear trend towards the creation
of a defense-energy industrial complex under state
control. But this trend also places pressure on ROE not
just to find ever more export markets abroad, something it already is doing, but also to become a major
player if not the key player in coordinating domestic
production of defense industry.
With the overall trend towards state control,
monopolization, and autarchy, we see a powerful and
increasingly concerted drive towards restoring past
structures and behaviors through the medium of key
companies like ROE. As early as 2003, STAC (CAST)
warned that exports would plateau and that defense
industry must reorient towards state contracts for
Russia’s armed forces.182 Moreover, this trend toward
reorienting the defense industry on behalf of domestic
consumers represents not just a trend towards autarchy
and to a considerable degree a retreat from globalization, it also fully comports with tendencies already
visible in 2001 toward greater state centralization and
control.
At that time Putin had opted to reconcentrate
arms sales and defense industry under his control,
supposedly to maximize revenues. To raise exports, he
merged Russia’s arms exporters, whose competition
allegedly knocked down the price of exports, into
one group under his direct authority. That move also
will force central control of all intergovernmental
military-technical commissions except those for
China and India, and will entail issuance of licenses
for foreign exports. Supposedly this step was to force
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many smaller or noncompetitive plants to concentrate
resources and production and create truly marketable
products. As noted earlier, Putin also decreed cuts of
over 600,000 mostly paper jobs in defense industry
through 2006, possibly closing factories and even whole
design groups. According to General Arkady Sitnov,
former head of the military’s procurement program,
in 1997 most of Russia’s 2,000 design bureaus were
not competitive.183 The aerospace and shipbuilding
industries in particular are supposed to be drastically
concentrated into state-controlled holding companies
as discussed earlier.184
While it was very uncertain whether these plans
could be implemented completely and overcome the
problems at both the local and central levels, it was
clear to observers as early as August 2000 (when the
plans were first being discussed) that they essentially
represented a return to the Soviet model.185 Shlykov, a
scathing critic of the system, agreed with the critiques
laid out above. He noted that the arms sales program
was a fantasy since Russia was selling weapons it
could not yet produce and using advance revenues
obtained from preliminary sales agreements to finance
that production.
To put it bluntly, this amounts to nothing more
than a Ponzi scheme. Shlykov also observed that the
system was so broken that, at best, it would produce
only 10 percent of Soviet defense output in 1991, that
90 percent of defense firms (whose number he claimed
was 1,700) had no orders and could not fulfill them even
if they received orders, and that subcontractors had
lost interest in dealing with the system. Whereas at that
time 800,000 people worked in aviation and aerospace
in Russia compared with 98,000 in Europe, Europe’s
production far exceeded Russia’s both qualitatively and

44

quantitatively. Russian military hardware’s real costs
are so high when compared to Western costs that Russia
has no comparative advantage; quite the opposite,
given low-quality production and poor workmanship.
Despite the fact that those few producers and exporters
who had been privatized are profiting and finding
a way in the market, Putin insisted on nationalizing
the defense industry. By restoring the Soviet model,
Moscow virtually ensured that the system would not
work, that conventional and nuclear missile branches
(since the latter are to be cut severely) would break
down, and that MoD would have to finance the entire
rearmament out of its own budget.186
While the concentration of producers in the arms
industry is clearly a worldwide trend in keeping with
the forces unleashed by globalization and the end
of the Cold War, the past record of Russian defense
industrial reforms and reorganizations (of which there
have been at least a dozen since 1991) leads one to
accept Shlykov’s assessment, not the government’s.187
Moreover, the overall economic policy seems to show
an increasing bias for more government control, not
less.188
Interestingly, the calls for expanded state control
and actions taken toward that end closely resemble
the failed plans of 2001, which attest to the state’s
incapacity to manage so huge a system. In other words,
we are witnessing a reinforcement of failure whereby
ever more centralization and state control become
the answer to earlier failures of the same policy. By
2004, Sergei Stepashin, Chairman of the State Audit
chamber, already had called for the state to assume
the regulatory function of debtor-creditor relations in
the defense sector to cope with the enormous number
of bankruptcies there.189 Similarly, Moskovskiy has
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urged the Federation Council to give the industry
more state support.190 And testifying to the widespread
and ingrained mantra of the Russian elite that the
answer is always more centralization and state control,
Federation Council chairman Sergei Mironov recently
declared:
Neither has the state shown any aptitude in
administering the programs currently overseen by it.
Putin and other high officials have stated that the 2005
state defense order was financed by 99.98 percent and
fulfilled by 97.3 percent.197 In fact, the state’s program
to begin its continuing integrating defense firms into
large holding companies in 2004 has been a failure.198
Putin’s advisor on defense industrial affairs, Aleksandr’
Burutin, recently admitted that although a new program
for the defense industry complex is being formed, the
old one was a total failure. Only 7 of the 34 integrated
structures were created and only a few of them were
operating efficiently. Nevertheless “a newly created
working group headed by Industry and Energy Minister
Viktor Khristenko is considering restructuring and
integration in all industries.”199 Similarly, in July 2005
Igor Gavriadsky, Deputy Head of the Federal Industry
Agency, admitted that of the 75 defense and high-tech
industries slated since 2002 for integration only three
had been fully established. Yet even so he demands
more state support for the industry and maintains the
widespread myth, common to high officials, that this
industry can be the locomotive for an overall industrial
recovery.200

Moreover, these problems could not be resolved
merely by raising defense spending, because in 2004
funding of the state order went up by 7 percent while
the output of hardware and armaments actually fell by
almost 5 percent.201 This set of figures merely confirms
the trend observed above toward stagnant or falling
production and procurement despite ever greater
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injections of cash into the system. Nevertheless,
despite considerable state attention to this sector and
endless reorganizations, some analysts and observers
still charge that the state has no defense industry
program, that the state refuses to support that sector,
and that the cumulative deficiencies of the sector and
of the state’s role could lead to the destruction of the
defense industry in 5 years.202 In 2005 Burutin admitted
that, while the state program envisaged integration
of industries to solve “the entire range of problems”
firms might face, in fact, the destructive tendencies
of the 1990s still typified the situation in this sector.203
He added that only 10 of the 75 firms scheduled for
integration had been established, so that, by his own
figures, integration in 2005 went backward.204
Neither was ROE any more effective in generating
revenues for the defense sector through arms sales.
According to the Russian Federation Accounting
Office, only 10-20 parent factories of the approximately
1,700 defense plants ever received actual export orders
from Rosoboroneksport. In 2001 it transferred only 4
percent of its net income to the federal budget, whereas
the law called for it to ante up 10-50 percent. Russia’s
Accounting Chamber, the supreme accounting body,
complained that not only were “irregularities” in
ROE’s financial procedures apparent, but that the
framework of its activity was so convoluted it defied
meaningful control.205 Similar machinations could
be found elsewhere in the defense industrial sector,
which one newspaper called “the most problemridden, closed, and bureaucratic sector of the economy.
Not one of the many programs designed to reform
it thus far,” the newpaper continued, “has yielded
any results.”206 Under these conditions, it is hardly
surprising, as Moskovskiy conceded, that the new
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armaments program is largely a political document
and that, in fact, insofar as contracts are concerned,
the government and this sector are still operating and
will continue to operate under the existing armaments
program.207 Moskovskiy added,
It is a paradox but the state customer works according to
[the] old legislation and normative base, and the general
contractor is already working according to market rules:
money in the morning, chairs in the evening. There is a
gap between these two spheres. They are coming together
extremely slowly and ineffectively. The effectiveness of
a ruble invested in this picture is sharply declining.208

Yet despite the failure of the state, its answer becomes
more of the same: centralization, state control,
monopoly, and autarchy.
Three New Reforms.
The current answer to these problems takes three
forms: (1) unification of all defense procurement into
a single office by 2007 as begun in late 2004 and again
advocated by Putin in his May 10, 2006, speech to the
Federal Assembly; (2) further integration of defense
industries, most recently the radio-electronic, air, and
now shipbuilding industries; and (3) the creation of a
military-industrial commission.209 First, with regard to
unification of procurement:
In 2005, the MoD will hire an external auditor to conduct
research on market costs of major weapon systems
in which the Ministry is interested. The Ministry’s
procurement and finance agency will introduce a uniform tender format for all armed services and non-MoD
Security agencies. Weapons will be procured at fixed
prices and the MoD suppliers will be bound by tighter
quality control, requirements, and delivery schedules.
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Few, however, expect rapid changes. A lawyer with the
MoD’s atomic energy agency told [Jane’s Defense Weekly]
that the lack of transparency inside the procurement
system serves the interests of both Ministry personnel
and contractors.210

Officials believe that setting up a single procurement
center in the Ministry will,
Facilitate coordinating both current and long-term
programs and plans for the creation of arms and military
equipment for domestic and foreign customers. It also
will raise the technical level of models of arms and
military equipment supplied for domestic needs up to
global requirements, ensure unified state control over
the quality of goods and a coordinated pricing policy,
and it will carry over the positive experience of militarytechnical cooperation in the performance of pre-contract
work and fulfilling contracts in the sphere of the state
defense order.211

While establishing this system certainly reduces the
number of procurement agencies throughout the
Russian defense and security sector, it still remains to
be seen whether a unified procurement system actually
will reduce costs and improve quality, effectiveness,
and efficiency. Transparency apparently is not even a
goal.
Second, with regard to integration of defense
industries, Ivanov and Putin steadfastly have
championed the idea of integrated defense industrial
firms controlled, if not owned, by the state. They began
with the helicopter and radio-electronic industries in
2003-04 and have since sought to create such integrated
holding companies throughout the sector.212 Thus in
the helicopter industry, ROE created an integrated
sector, consolidating plants and design bureaus under
the “multisector investment and industrial group”
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Oboronprom.213 Since then, it has embarked upon a
spree of acquisitions and integrations as recounted
above. Ivanov apparently believes that the integration
of both state-owned and shareholding enterprises in
these vertically integrated behemoths will force out the
uncompetitive firms through bankruptcy proceedings
and lead to a concentration of efficient resources in more
competitive integrated establishments invigorated by
new management.214 Thus the regime seeks to set up
these vertically integrated holdings on the basis of vital
end products and horizontally integrated structures
based upon auxiliary technologies and components.215
Ivanov believes that such vertically and horizontally
integrated holding firms will, as in Soviet times,
produce high-tech civilian goods even though few of
the old defense plants were closed after 1991 and most
of them still cannot compete even in the defense sector,
let alone in consumer products.216 Furthermore,
Sergei Ivanov continues to insist that large holding
companies be formed in the defense industry based on the
types of arms that they produce. The Almaz-Antey Air
Defense Concern and the Tactical Missiles Corporation
already exist, and decisions have been made to create a
consolidated aircraft manufacturing company, a missileand-space holding company, and another in the field of
electronics. Next in line are armored equipment and
shipbuilding, the latter to be divided into manufacturers
of surface ships and submarines.217

In a similar case, the Russian Conventional Weapons
Agency in 2003-04 began setting up similar vertically
integrated holding companies across Russia for small
arms, precision-guided missiles, and optronics, plus
an optical holding company.218 Experience suggests
that these vertically integrated firms cannot survive
except by dependence upon the state order and thus
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are dependent upon the state. Certainly this is what
happened in 2003-04.219 Thus, in effect, even if there are
private owners or shareholders, the state controls these
firms.
An example from February 7, 2005, shows just
how this state control is ensured. On that date, the
state transferred to the Tactical Missiles Corporation
38 percent of the shares of Salyut OAO (joint stock
company), 38 percent of the shares of Smolensk
Aviation Plant OAO, and 50+ percent of shares of
Gorizont OAO. To acquire these shares, the Tactical
Missiles Corporation is conducting further share issues
on behalf of the state to be reimbursed by the shares in
the companies being transferred.220 Thus the state has
become or will become the dominant shareholder in
these firms.
The most recent example is the creation of a unified
aviation firm to manufacture both civilian and military
aircraft, as originally proposed in 2003. Once again,
the state will be the main shareholder, if not owner.
This proposal encountered considerable resistance,
leading many to suspect that issues connected with
this integration and possible criminal connections in
the industry were behind the murder of key aircraft
firm executives in 2003.221 But the government has
persisted, recently launching the integration of five
commercial airline companies and pressing Aeroflot
to buy out other domestic carriers to consolidate the
domestic aircraft industry. It hopes to force a massive
concentration of resources in a single unified corporate
structure that will encompass the full range of civilian
as well as military aircraft production. It is hoped that
this will safeguard Russia’s technological independence
and ability to compete on the world market in both
civilian and defense aircraft.222 Such consolidation may
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be justified economically because a good number of
Russia’s many airline firms are struggling to stay alive,
with much actual production capacity having been lost
since 1991. Integration also is spreading to companies
that manufacture aircraft engines, despite calls for
retaining competition here.
Meanwhile, it is still unclear whether there really
is the political will here or elsewhere to cut away all
the dead wood of the past generation.223 As Valery
Bezverkhny, First Vice President of the Irkut aircraft
firm, said, “We have an overcapacity on paper but
much of the real manufacturing capability has been
lost.” Yet those firms, facilities, and personnel continue
to exist.224
Ostensibly, the intent “is to provide a focus for
the limited amount of state funding available for
aerospace defense research and development, and
to begin to rationalize the sector to a size at which
it is sustainable.”225 But it also is clear that the state
will wholly control these vertically integrated firms
whether they are in the aerospace or other industries.
Boris Aleshin, formerly Deputy Prime Minister and
now Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Industry,
told an interviewer that the new aerospace firm United
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) will manufacture and
provide not just aircraft but also follow-on service and
marketing support. Each division of the company,
whether it be commercial, logistics, military transport,
or combat, will sign contracts and pursue “normal
activity.” But the managing company directed by the
state obviously will coordinate all these efforts. Although OAK’s structure is supposed to be transparent to all businessmen, the managing company
will “control assets, form reserve and investment
funds, and develop favorable conditions for business
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development.”226 In other words, the managing
company will exercise firm financial and political
control on behalf of the state over all the various
divisions of the aerospace business as united into one
giant holding company.
However, behind this rosy scenario there are many
problems. The state will own 75 percent of OAK,
and, while most of the companies entering into Irkut
are state-owned or controlled, Irkut is a successfully
restructured public company of which the European
Aviation and Defense Group (EADS) owns 10 percent
and institutional investors own 30 percent. Integrating
Irkut into OAK means renationalizing this firm. As
one recent assessment concludes, this trend parallels
what happened in the oil industry, where Kremlin
officials, often from the power ministries (the so-called
Siloviki) have taken control. Neither is this an unusual
occurrence; Putin is pushing for the consolidation of
all of Russia’s automobile manufacturers into a single
integrated state-run group; Rosoboroneksport is taking
control of another major car manufacturer, AvtoVaz,
which is one of those three firms. Thus ROE, i.e., the
state, is renationalizing the automotive industry and
also is trying to move into metals, including acquisition
of the firm VSMPO-Avisma, the largest Russian
producer of titanium.227
In addition, ROE evidently plans to form a large
new metallurgy industry holding to unite all the major
enterprises that produce strategic raw materials for
the aerospace industry under its management and
control, and has begun taking steps towards that
goal. The purpose is not just to prevent the “capture
of these industries by foreign firms or by allegedly
criminal firms,” but rather to keep all strategic raw
materials under autarchic state control through ROE,
which will be the muscle behind them.228 This trend
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to autarchy can be seen in the reluctance of ROE to
support joint ventures with foreign governments and/
or firms since it does not receive a commission from
them. This preference for supply contracts over joint
ventures or service contracts may inhibit realization of
the goal of improving funding and innovation through
involvement of foreign partners.
Nevertheless, within the Russian defense industry
it is clear that ROE is emerging as a financial-industrial
power in its own right.229 Indeed, under Chemezov’s
leadership ROE is attempting to maintain one foot
in the very secretive world of arms sales and defense
industry and the other foot in the more overt world of
public policy. In April 2006 Chemezov mobilized the
hitherto dormant Russian Union of Machine Builders,
getting about 50 large companies to join the Union’s
original 16 founders, and got himself and his deputy
appointed to lead the Union. The Union’s new mission
was described as “active lobbying for the interests
of the [heavy industry and the defense sector] on
regional, federal, and international levels.”230 Thus
the Union became a vehicle for lobbying on behalf of
preferential treatment and increased arms sales and
defense spending.
Simultaneously, as we have noted above, ROE is
expanding the process of state takeover and integration
of private and public firms into the automobile and
metallurgical sector as well. Once these mergers are
completed, Aleshin already has promised to turn his
attention to the shipbuilding industry, which will also
be integrated under state control. ROE undoubtedly
will play its now-familiar role as the state’s agent for
financial control over these integrated giants.231
Finally, the third new reform is creation of a
permanent, strengthened Military-Industrial Commis-
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sion (MIC) to which ROE is being subordinated and
which will represent what appears to be in all but name
a new MoD industry. But it will also exercise control
over much of the civilian sector such as the metals
(including titanium) and automotive industry.232
This trend is in effect a concerted response to such
complaints as Burutin’s in 2005, i.e., that uncontrolled
privatization and bankruptcies, as well as a decline
in state control, were still occurring in the defense
industrial sector despite the move toward integrated
firms. Burutin observed that only 10 of the 75 planned
firms were in any way integrated.233 Therefore, in his
view, a comprehensive reorganization plus a program
of state support for defense industry, including
perfection of the “power vertical” structure, were
needed to rescue it.234 Moreover, such programs were
necessary because,
The defense industry incorporating high-tech branches
and carrying out 75 percent of R&D can become the
only starting point for boosting the innovations policy
in Russia and form the basis for reviving our country’s
economy. The defense industrial complex is surely
capable of launching serial production of modern
weapon systems for qualitative rearmament of our
Army, Navy, and law-enforcement structures.235

Thus Stalin’s hobby horse idea, ridden often by Putin,
here gallops again: the defense sector remains the only
true force for economic and great power revival.236
This MIC is not a new organization. As Ivanov
observed, it has always existed. Now, however, it will
be a permanent body that makes timely, rapid, and
effective decisions in controlling the defense industrial
sector.237 Indeed, by 2004 Moskovskiy was calling for a
restored MIC at the Prime Ministerial level, one “with
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standing executive powers, a permanent staff, and the
tasks of running the defense sector, coordinating statesector defense customers, drawing up and placing
defense procurement orders, and given pricing and
tariff setting powers as well.” He believed that “the
market will not regulate this, the state must direct
its own defense procurement.”238 Obviously, this
statement indicates which way the bureaucratic wind
was blowing by that time.
But the actual decision to re-create this commission
in November 2005 clearly stemmed from Baluyevsky’s
public complaint that this sector could not meet the
military’s plans by 2010-11. Given the continuing
crisis in this sector despite all of Putin’s reforms
through 2005, it is quite likely that his warnings were
not misplaced. Indeed, Ivanov and Putin agreed with
him.239 A chorus of newspaper accounts reported the
paltry quantitative results of procurement, the rising
costs of materials, the pervasive corruption, and the lack
of transparency in this sector. Even officials admitted
that the quality of weapons had been in decline since
2004.240 The centralization undertaken since 2000
was not bringing about the decisive transformations
required by the regime, so the predictable answer was
more centralization and an announcement that the
MIC was coming under Ivanov’s control.
This MIC continues the process begun in 2004 to
make Ivanov’s Ministry a kind of super ministry as
noted above.241 Beginning in 2004, Ivanov engineered
the removal of Chief of Staff General Anatoly
Kvashnin and launched a series of “reforms” of the
internal organization of the MoD, centralizing it even
more under his control.242 He then began to rebuild
the defense industrial administrations, taking control
of FS Rosoboronzakaz (Federal Service for the Defense

56

Order or, more accurately, Defense Procurement),
Rosoboroneksport, and the Federal Agency for MilitaryTechnical Cooperation.243 According to Ivanov, the
new MIC under his control will be a permanently
operating body with broad powers, possibly even
including preparation of draft presidential resolutions
and overseeing their enforcement.244 The MIC, he said,
will operate on a permanent basis, allowing it “expeditiously to manage the country’s defense industry,
handle specific programs for its development, and
draft government resolutions and presidential decrees
pertaining to its development.”245 Although Ivanov
denied that he is creating a large new bureaucracy, he
admitted that the MIC is becoming a “new mechanism
of administration.”246
Although Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov sought
to gain control over the MIC and force Ivanov,
who double-hats as a Deputy Prime Minister, to
report to him, he failed, indicating both the ongoing
bureaucratic struggles within the government and
Ivanov’s primacy.247 These struggles are the daily
stuff of Russian politics, with everyone having a
substantial interest in a sector maneuvering to gain
exclusive control over it at the expense of rivals.248
Indeed, the decree making Ivanov head of the MIC
further weakened Fradkov because, while he has the
authority to approve its decisions, he is not part of
the commission. The commission is a permanently
standing body outside the regular government, and
its leaders, save for Ivanov himself, are not part of
the government apparatus. Moreover, Ivanov and his
team need not reconcile, coordinate, or discuss their
deliberations with Fradkov or the regular government
before submitting them for approval. They can also
draft presidential resolutions and decrees without
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submitting them to Fradkov for approval because of
Ivanov’s position as Defense Minister.249
Creation of the MIC also weakened the regular
government, moving ever more key functions into the
presidential administration which oversees Ivanov’s
expanded domain, and removing them from any kind
of Parliamentary or public accountability. As one
observer commented,
Economic Development Minister German Gref and
industry and energy Minister Viktor Khristenko will
unequivocally be the losers in this reshuffle in addition
to Mikhail Fradkov. The former loses control of the
defense order, and it is not known at all what the latter
heads now. The Federal Agency for Industry under Boris
Aleshin’s leadership will pass under [Deputy Chief of
the MIC, Vladislav] Putilin’s wing, because it essentially
tackled . . . the military industry.250

Similarly, it is now the case that the MIC will tell the
government and Ministry of Finance what the defense
order will be before the state budget is drawn up rather
than the other way around as had hitherto been the
case and logic would dictate. In effect, the MIC will
have a privileged and unquestioned priority in that
budget which is unaccountable to any legislative or
regular governmental scrutiny. Instead, the defense
order remains an economic and budgetary charge
accountable only to the President personally and to
his direct line of command down through Ivanov.251
Here again, we see that the entire defense sector and
the industries it will control, as part of what might
be called the President’s personal government, have
been removed from any kind of governmental or
Parliamentary oversight.
Ivanov was also granted the right to choose his
own high-ranking officials from the government
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and presidential administration for commensurate
posts within the MIC. He will control a budget of
approximately $42 billion, which includes budgets of
the MoD and the budget of Khristenko’s Ministry of
Industry and Energy. He also will distribute foreign
arms sales through ROE, which he now also controls.252
Inasmuch as the entire defense establishment ultimately reports to Putin, not Fradkov, the defense
industrial sector—which is expanding into the civilian
economy—now has been removed from any oversight
and control by the regular government. By way of
emphasis, apparently, Ivanov’s Deputy, Retired
Lieutenant General Vladislav Putilin, publicly stated
that he and the other members of the MIC will be
permanently in charge of certain problematic areas
relating to weapons development on land, sea, and air;
that he is totally independent of the regular government
staff; and that he was authorized to assume control of
the so-called national projects for the military-industrial
complex.253 Similarly, Ivanov is calling for the MIC to
direct defense industry to produce high-tech civilian
products. Although he denies this is a reversion to the
Soviet system whereby defense plants also produced
pots, pans, and what have you for the civilian sector,
that in fact is exactly what is happening.254
It is thus clear that the MIC also will assume directive or coordinative responsibility regarding projects
and programs erstwhile managed by other ministries,
giving it control over much of the civilian sector. Its
oversight of the budget of the Ministry of Industry and
Energy will, of course, only reinforce such authority.255
It is equally clear that the MIC bids fair to become a
government within the government, another part of
the presidential administration reserved essentially
to Putin’s autocratic and patrimonial fiefdom with no
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oversight from society. In other words, the outcome
of the bureaucratic struggle between Fradkov and
Ivanov, which Ivanov has won, presages an enormous
expansion of the MoD’s remit into the civilian
economy, and the consequent further militarization of
that economy.256
Not surprisingly, this development now will require
a new and enormous bureaucracy to supervise the
agencies and industries overseen by the MIC in monitoring implementation of state policy. The MIC supposedly will ensure that at least half of future defense
budgets is spent on development of the armed forces;
establish a unified procurement and supply system
for weapons, military hardware, and logistic support;
and “substantially increase the number of modern
long-range aircraft, submarines, and launchers in the
Strategic Missile Force.”257 Beyond ensuring greater
coordination and output, as well as more rational
expenditure of the state order, the MIC will have to deal
with the skyrocketing price of energy, labor, materials,
and transport, and recruit more young professionals
to this field. It also will have to establish more stable
and long-term contracts and plans, i.e., for 3, 5, and 10
years, not annual contracts and weapon production
cycles.258 On behalf of these goals, Ivanov already has
called for a new weapons program for 2007-15 and a
28 percent increase in the procurement budget and a
unified procurement and logistics system.259
It is clear from the foregoing that even if Russia,
as Putin and Ivanov have often claimed, will not
engage in a Soviet-style arms race, it is reverting to
an ever more Soviet, or at least Tsarist-like, defense
industrial structure. Today the defense apparatus as
a whole, including its expanding economic structures,
is removed from control by either Parliament or the
regular government, clearly having become part of
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Putin’s personal administration or Votchina in a modern
sense.260 Hence they will be even less transparent than
before.
In keeping with the Russian tradition that in trying
to root out inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, the government instinctively resorts to more centralization.
This centralization then entails the creation of ever
more auditing and inspection agencies to perform
those regulatory functions summed up in the Russian
definition of the word Kontrol’. Ivanov thus is creating
what one writer called an audit pyramid under him
in the MIC commensurate with the vast militarization
of the economy over which he now presides. The
justification for such compounded monitoring is that
otherwise rampant corruption will ensue. Once again,
the market has not been trusted. For such monitoring,
as long experience elsewhere has shown, markets do
better than any other human contrivance.261
Since the MIC’s instruction specifies that it will be
the chief standing body for implementing state policy in
the defense sector through the completion of the 200715 armament program, the MIC will remain in existence
for another 9-10 years at least. Thus it will oversee the
establishment in 2007 of a single agency to oversee
all purchases of military hardware and rear services
property and logistics. Not only will that agency have
oversight responsibility for several hundred billion
rubles annually, it will have to perform functions of
Kontrol’, i.e., assuring that all this money is spent on
buying goods and services through single contracts.
This responsibility includes an anti-corruption feature
“since the military will decide what to buy, and the
agency’s specialists will decide where to buy it.”262
As Mukhin pointed out earlier, this system already
exists within the MoD where FS Rosoboronzakaz
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exercises such oversight functions under the MoD’s control. Indeed, that agency already duplicates the same
functions as the state’s Auditing Chamber. Yet neither
the Auditing Chamber nor FS Rosoboronzakaz will be
abolished when this new purchasing and auditing
organization is set up. Indeed, FS Rosoboronzakaz,
which is already supervised by ROE, apparently will
become an independent agency outside the Defense
Ministry that supervises the new agency and then
reports to the Auditing Chamber. Thus we have
Ivanov’s “auditing pyramid,” with numerous Kontrol’
agencies supervising each other as well as the entire
procurement process.263
ROE also works closely with Rosoboronzakaz as
it imports foreign defense technology for the armed
forces’ use to help them realize the defense order and
enhanced procurement quality.264 This kind of structure
highlights one of the abiding features of the rentgranting state and rent-seeking elite relationship. This
system virtually compels the state to set up an endless
and proliferating number of Kontrol’ organizations to
regulate, monitor, inspect, and verify implementation
of policies. Each of these bureaucracies inevitably falls
prey to the same pathologies as exist elsewhere in the
state administration. Rather than regulate by law and
market, bureaucratic despotism and centralization
are invoked as mantras, only to fail and lead to fresh
attempts to square the circle at a higher level of
centralized and thus incompetent, nonresponsible
authority. Moreover, within this administrative system
typical of Russian history, ROE likely will play a vastly
more important supervisory and Kontrol’ type role
than merely overseeing the sales of Russian weapons
abroad. Most likely, it will be the MIC’s key agency
to regulate the defense industrial sector. Yet, as ROE
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plays this role of Kontrol’ and public policymaker, it
clearly will not forsake the opacity that has brought
it so far. As we have noted above, ROE is itself mired
in financial irregularities and secretive practices that
shun the light of outside monitorship and exposure.
Nevertheless,
ROE has accumulated enough of what its officials call
“saved profits” to start investing in defense R&D projects
with solid export prospects. In addition to drawing on
its own assets, ROE has been able to freely attract credit
resources from [the state foreign trade bank] and other
financial institutions.265

ROE and Defense Industry.
There are abundant grounds for concluding that
the state and the economy are regressing, and that the
economy is experiencing growing militarization. First
of all, there is no doubt that Putin and the Russian
government believe that, “in terms of its significance
and scope, the global weapons market is comparable
with such segments of the global economy as energy
and food. Competition here is extremely strong.”266
Similarly, as early as 2004, management changes at key
defense industrial firms like the RSK MiG corporation
led Ruslan Pukhov, Director of STAC (CAST), to
observe:
The latest events point to the conversion of
Rosoboroneksport, which is in the hands of presidential
appointees, into a kind of MoD Industry. It was Sergei
Chemezov, CEO of the national military-technical
cooperation broker [i.e., ROE] who was the key figure
in the formation of the Vertolety Milya [Mil’ helicopters]
helicopter holding company, and it was he who lobbied
for the appointment to the post of head of MiG of
Aleksei Fedorov, his Irkutsk high school classmate.
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After this, the MiG corporation will most likely lose the
right to independent foreign economic activity or will
not avail itself of it, having signed over the authority to
Rosoboroneksport.267

Pukhov then drew the only appropriate conclusion,
namely, that the state was now going to impose order
from above as well as ownership and control over the
defense industrial sector.268
There is no doubt that ROE can play this role. An
estimated 70-90 percent of the revenues and production
volume of many critical defense companies is tied
to exports of systems or of spare parts, giving ROE
enormous leverage vis-à-vis these industries.269 Today
ROE proclaims itself “the sole state intermediary
agency for Russia’s exports/imports of defense-related
and dual-use products, technologies, and services.”270
This observation fully accords with Chemezov’s
publicly stated view that only one government-owned
company should be exporting Russian defense products
abroad. Otherwise, he indicated every time multiple
exporters appeared, the volume of sales plummeted.
Still, he does support keeping private firms in reserve
as independent sellers of spare parts.271
Indeed, Chemezov has been an unapologetic
proponent of state control of the defense industrial
sector by ROE from at least 2003, if not before. And
throughout this period, he consistently has striven to
increase both his and ROE’s power and profile within
the government, thus enhancing state control over
the sector through him and his organization.272 Even
as the entire defense industrial and arms sales sector
underwent numerous reshuffles and reorganizations
in 2000-05, suggesting that the status quo is by no
means immutable, he held to this position.273 Thus in
2003 during one such reorganization, he unsuccessfully
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proposed that ROE, which is a federal state unitary
enterprise, be converted into a joint stock company
and that, as part of this process, a percentage of shares
from the military-industrial holding companies that
were then being formed be transferred to ROE. This
percentage should be high enough to impart veto
authority. This way, ROE could place its people on the
holding companies’ boards and control their foreign
economic activities. Indeed, in numerous defense
industries ROE personnel already were sitting on the
boards of directors of the company along with other
state officials.
This is because in 2003, as part of the periodic and
ongoing bureaucratic reshufflings, ROE was placed
under the control of the Federal Service of MilitaryTechnical Cooperation (FSVTS). This was due, at least
in part, to the new law of 2002 subjecting all Federal
state unitary enterprises, including ROE, to the state,
in this case represented by FSVTS. AS ROE was less
than delighted by this process, it proposed to float
ROE’s shares, transfer them to the state, and set up, on
the basis of the ensuing joint stock company, “a core
holding company in the sphere of military-technical
cooperation, oriented to the implementation of state
policy in this sphere.” Putin decided against doing this
and instead appeared inclined to move FSVTS out from
control of the MoD to direct subordination to him.274
Chemezov’s plan was rejected then, but it now
appears to have succeeded.275 Nevertheless, there are
reports that ROE may be undergoing another reorganization that would change its corporate structure
and legal status.276 Still, the rejection of Chemezov’s
plans in 2003-04 had two significant outcomes. First,
for some time this decision subordinated ROE to the
FSVTS. FSVTS plays a key role in arms sales because
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it issues licenses to exporters for each specific deal,
sets prices, ensures compliance with state policy in
military-technical cooperation, and grants the right
to firms to do business in some parts. Since the right
to export depends on securing licenses, FSVTS has a
major share of control over exports, and this forces
ROE to engage closely with it.277 Thus, in fact, there is a
high degree of overlap in these two agencies’ functions
and consequently much rivalry. It was FSVTS that
quashed Chemezov’s original proposal for making
ROE a joint stock company. This rivalry restrains both
organizations, allowing for Ivanov and thus Putin to
have alternative views on how the defense industrial
sector and arms sales policies ought to be organized.
Hence bureaucratic rivalry remains, as in the best
tradition of Russian politics, a built-in factor in arms
sales policy and in so many other sectors of Russian
politics.
Second, the decision of 2004, pushed by FSVTS,
also subordinated ROE to the MoD and allowed ROE
and the Ministry to begin taking control of financial
flows from arms sales and to some extent of defense
investments.278 It also cemented ROE’s subordinate
relationship; close contact still exists between ROE and
the Ministry which undoubtedly will carry over into
ROE’s relationship to the MIC.
ROE works closely with the Ministry to increase
control over trade in conventional weapons, raise
funds for future R&D activities through arms sales,
supply the armed forces with hardware and training,
and build an effective security system with other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) through military-technical cooperation (VTS),
often at subsidized prices. This involvement entails
visits by Ivanov to foreign capitals or strategically
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important regions in Russia in order to conclude
working agreements and decide which weapons
to release from the Ministry for sale or lease abroad
by ROE.279 The Ministry’s prior involvement in such
preliminary path-clearing appears to be a precondition
for ROE’s detailed implementation, including actual
contracting. Such sales sometime include obligations
to train the foreign forces who will be operating the
weapons or equipment purchased. If any such training
obligations are in the contract, the Ministry needs to be
involved.280 Ivanov obviously has significant influence
over the entire field of military-technical cooperation
abroad. Moreover, he enjoys Putin’s confidence and
even recommends high-level appointments to ROE.281
Given Ivanov’s consistent aggrandizement of
power within MoD throughout the period since 2003,
it is hardly surprising that ROE has encouraged the
formation of the large vertical integrated holding
companies in the defense sector and their spread into
other industries. As the consolidation of the MoD’s
control over the entire defense sector has accelerated
and strengthened, ROE at the same time has been able
to expand its oversight functions over defense industry.
In 2005 it announced plans to increase its involvement
in the management of export-oriented enterprises,
particularly the holding companies.282 Of course, if
a company originally was not part of those holding
companies but was subsequently integrated into them,
as is now increasingly becoming the norm, it becomes
fair game for ROE, who is clearly moving in a big way
into the ostensibly civilian economy. What Chemezov
now claims to want is not so much to hold shares in
these firms, let alone a controlling interest, but to be
able to gain seats on their boards of directors.283
But in fact, Chemezov wants power over the
entire sector, including ownership of shares of defense
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sector firms. He is trying to have his deputy, Vladimir
Pakhmonov, appointed as head of the new civilian
unified defense procurement office so that Pakhmonov
would control all defense procurement.284 Similarly,
Chemezov has announced the formation of ROE’s
own holding company, OPK Oboronprom (Unified
Industrial Corporation). This firm appears to have
grown out of the helicopter holding firm of the same
name. Oboronprom is supposedly not intended to sign
contracts for arms sales, but rather to decide how best
to implement contracts and to decide which firm will
execute it.285 Oboronprom actually will be a powerful
organizational and financial weapon over all defense
industries to ensure their submission to state dictates.
Indeed, this may have been part of the plan all along.
In fact, despite Chemezov’s statements, Oboronprom is an essential mechanism in providing ROE the
means to buy stock and install its representatives in
defense firm management. In 2004, Chemezov already
was advocating such a plan, only to be rebuffed
then.286 But since then, clearly his view has prevailed.
Oboronprom, structured as a multiprofile investment
group, was set up to allow ROE and Rosimushchestvo (the
Federal Agency for Management of Federal Property)
to buy stock in export-oriented defense firms, e.g., the
recently formed helicopter holding company of the
same name.287 More recently, the integrated helicopter
industry, whose integration was engineered by ROE,
has been placed on the list of strategic enterprises closed
to foreign investment.288 Some analysts believe that the
new Oboronprom has enough financial and lobbying
power to consolidate whole sectors of industry in this
fashion.289
Thus Oboronprom, supported by presidential
decrees, has taken over several firms and placed
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its managers on their boards in the new vertically
integrated helicopter holding company, and now
owns a high percentage of shares in numerous other
firms, e.g., Sukhoi.290 Similarly, Oboronprom has
actively encouraged the process of forming these large,
vertically integrated firms in the aircraft, helicopter,
shipbuilding, missile-buidling, and defensive systems
sectors. Seeking to expand its influence over the
programs and capacity of these industries, ROE has
established ownership and management roles in them,
often through Oboronprom’s purchase of their shares or
placement of management officials in them. These firms
include the new OAK, the United Industrial Enterprise
helicopter firm, Baltiyski Zavod and Severnaya Verf
shipbuilding firms, the Air Defense holding company
Ob’edinitelnye Systemi (United Systems), the missile
firm Takticheskoe Raketnoye Vooruzheniye, and
Almaz-Antey air defense firm. ROE, as noted earlier,
also has moved into the automobile and metallurgy
industries.291
Thus by acting as the state’s agent in the purchase
of controlling or at least veto-wielding interests in
defense firms and then extending that control into
other predominantly civilian sectors, and by placing
its people on their boards, ROE acts as a major player
in bringing those industries under state control and
reorganizing the defense industry.292 ROE is involved
in the work of over 700 enterprises, providing credit
totaling 3-4 billion rubles annually under its guarantee
and insurance arrangements.293
Equally important, those other companies which,
under previous legislation and decrees, have received
the right to export independently and have the means
to do so are, in practice, cooperating quite closely
with ROE. It remains to be seen whether they can
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compete with ROE, or whether the latter can compete
with them while maintaining the terms of the newest
reorganization of defense industry depicted above.
In any case, even if ROE cannot compete with these
other firms in the world market, by law those firms are
obliged to relinquish 51 percent of their shares to the
state if they are going to sell arms abroad.294 Therefore,
ROE might be able to find bureaucratic, i.e., nonmarket
or extra-market, ways of subordinating them to its
control, if not having outright ownership. Furthermore,
in view of ROE’s expanding role in both defense and
civilian industry, including the managerial realm, ROE
and the new MIC will interact a great deal in fulfilling
the latter’s mandate to streamline the financing of
military production.295
As part of this interaction, ROE has been and
probably will continue to be active in importing foreign
defense technologies so that Russian firms can meet
the state defense order, which is soon likely to become
the biggest source of orders, surpassing orders from
abroad. ROE’s entree into the state defense industrial
sector will also oblige it to become more involved in
seeing to the fulfillment of the state order. Indeed, such
an interaction fits with Chemezov’s expressed view
that ROE should “place orders for export of military
hardware and hold tenders for Russian plants.”296
Further action along those lines obviously would
expand ROE’s commercial activities greatly.
As both state control and opacity grow in this sector,
there is a reversion not only to Soviet-type strictures
but also to pressure to adopt Soviet-style practices,
e.g., selling arms on credit. Although Ivanov recently
has reiterated that Russia will not sell weapons on
credit (though it may make loans to solvent countries),
Moscow already has forgiven three-fourths of Syria’s
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debt to Russia in order to sell that country weapons.297
Likewise, Russia’s recent arms sales deal with Algeria
entails forgiveness of Algeria’s old debt to the Soviet
Union in return for Algerian implementation of the
deal and purchase of Russian arms.298 ROE benefits
under this arrangement because no arms will be
shipped until payment has been received, giving ROE
and its firms quicker access to capital. Russia may also
receive compensation by gaining access for Russian
energy companies to Algerian oil and gas fields.299 At
the same time, ROE has also announced its willingness
to entertain flexible approaches to payment for weapons
sales, including payment in goods or, as Chemezov
says, returning to barter trade.300 This is another way in
which Russia could expand its foreign client network.
ROE and the entire sector are under pressure to
expand their client base for a number of reasons. First,
as we have seen, Putin, Ivanov, and Chemezov all
recognize that arms sales are no less a strategic sector
than energy, and they are a major source of external
funding for the recovery of Russia’s defense capability.
Indeed, control over funding from arms sales is regarded as the only means of ensuring the renewal of Russia’s
military capability in the future.301 Second, there is an
ongoing shift from air and air defense systems to the
naval systems as the predominant weapons of choice
in the export business. This necessitates a reorientation
to new clients or to different needs of existing clients.302
While it remains unclear whether this is a long-term
trend, ROE must adapt to the possibility that it will
be of long duration since ROE’s client base clearly is
diversifying as Russia seeks arms sales opportunities
in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and
Africa, in addition to India and China.
China and India both have sought to enhance
their own indigenous production capability and
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even to diversify among customers. Moreover, they
are also increasingly compelling Russia to sell them
technology and know-how to enable them to take such
steps.303 As this author and others have noted, this
trend was foreseeable since the global market has been
for some time a buyer’s market to which sellers must
adapt to compete.304 Therefore, ROE and the Russian
government, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding,
must be flexible, offering new creative ways of making
deals, e.g., debt for deals, offset packages, barter, or
access to energy fields in return for arms.
Conclusion.
Even though the defense industry has been in
failure for over 15 years and already was backward
technologically during the late Soviet epoch, it still
contains 75 percent of Russia’s research, development,
test, and evaluation capacity, a continuing legacy of
Stalinism. And despite the experience of all Russia’s
major interlocutors, its officials still believe that the
defense sector can again become the locomotive of
high-tech production.305 Clearly we are dealing with a
leadership that, with a simple answer to all problems,
lacks complete knowledge and understanding of
the outside world. That simple answer, of course, is
centralization and state control, methods that just
happen to enrich the apparatchiks who conceive and
implement them. The takeover by the state of this sector
parallels what is happening throughout the economy,
and the deleterious results of such state control for
growth are obvious to all.306
Although officials continue to demand the restoration
of an industrial policy and aggressive state policies to
make it happen, the addition of more bureaucrats—for
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that is what centralization and state control entail—
only increases the number of corrupt rent-seeking
elites fighting for a piece of a gradually diminishing or
too-slowly-growing pie.307 Thus, among other things,
the new “anti-corruption” campaign is compromised
before it starts. Endemic corruption, rent-seeking, and
rent-granting are the true motors of the economy and
government.308 Anders Aslund recently observed,
As all of these examples demonstrate, structural effects
are of no interest to the government. Re-nationalization
is being driven by the interests of state officials looking
to extend their power and wealth. The government does
not even promote these moves until they have already
happened, and there is no apparent ideology behind
nationalization.309

Thus these drives toward rent-granting of profitable
sectors of the economy to loyal rent-seeking elites are
continuing.
The cabinet is now working on a document that
bars foreign investment in any so-called strategic
enterprise where that investment could be interpreted
as “an attempt to establish control.” Governmental
approval must be obtained before any such investment
occurs, and one easily can guess how those affected
firms and the state will react to such intrusions.310 We
therefore can reasonably expect that foreign efforts
to invest either in the energy sector or in the defense
and high-tech sectors will be inhibited greatly, if not
totally frustrated. Inasmuch as the crisis in the defense
industrial sector continues, and the responses to it are
simply more defense spending and procurement along
with greater opacity and state control, the structural
factors underlying the crisis will not be addressed.311
These “solutions” ensure as well that the structural
militarization characteristic of the Soviet economy,
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cogently decried by Shlykov, will revive and gain
further impetus.312 Likewise, we can expect an even
more determined effort to sell arms abroad, even if
they are inferior quality, to more and more consumers,
not just for the sake of diversifying customers, but also
to safeguard the positions of the elite. There is also, of
course, the ever-present podtekst (subtext) of reacting
to putative U.S. pressure, both strategic and ideologic,
upon Russia. We can also expect more sales to states
like China, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and other potential
“bad actors” around the world. Indeed, one reason
Moscow opposes sanctions on Iran is that they could
lead to a cessation, under a United Nations ruling, of
Russian defense exports to that country.313
For the foreseeable future, we can expect to see
further efforts to extend and consolidate the neoMuscovite paradigm of rent-granting and rent-seeking
that we have seen as increasingly characteristic of the
overall economy.314 We even see more than a hint of a
resusitation of Ivan the Terrible’s draconian extreme
whereby his private governmental possessions
were severed from the regular government and
economy of the time. Russian analysts may justify the
“sequestration” of the defense sector under the total
control of the president and the lack of parliamentary
supervision over its relations with the state by
comparing it to European practices regarding defense
industry.315 But nothing in Europe approaches the
renewal of tsarist-like power that we are now seeing in
Russia and which only brings closer the likelihood of
another economic-political crash.
The trends visible for some time in the
defense industrial sector—rent-seeking, rent-granting,
autocratic opacity, economic nationalism and autarchy,
asset-stripping, pervasive corruption, and the return
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to Soviet practices of barter, credits, and noncash
transactions fueled by bribes—can only lead to another
dead end. Whether that crash comes sooner or later,
we cannot say, but there is no doubt that this paradigm
is intrinsically suboptimizing and noncompetitive
with the economic organization of other states. As
history shows, it inevitably leads Russia into strategic
competitions that it cannot afford and to economic and
political rigor mortis. If this structure continues, can
Russia—and the global community—afford the crash
that becomes increasingly more thinkable with each
regressive step?
Recommendations.
Recent events should tell analysts and policymakers
alike that trends relating to Russian arms sales are not
mere academic issues which we need to grasp so as to
stay on top of our Russian specialty. Apart from the
ongoing sale of Russian weapons to China, which is a
matter of long-standing U.S. concern, Moscow, in the
recent past, has consummated major arms sales of SU30 fighters, helicopters, and kalashnikovs (numbering
100,000 assault rifles) to Venezuela, announced its
support for opening a factory there to produce weapons
locally, proclaimed its readiness to sell weapons to
Argentina in return for beef, and was exposed as the
principal supplier of deadly short-range rockets and
antitank missiles as well as possible antiair missiles
to Iran and Syria, which thereupon were transferred
to Hezbollah in Lebanon.316 Not surprisingly, the U.S.
Government also recently announced sanctions against
ROE and Sukhoi for their arms sales to Iran, although
Moscow interpreted the sanctions as a response to the
sales to Venezuela.317
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These actions on Moscow’s part strongly suggest
that it has abandoned any pretense of cooperation with
Washington in the Middle East and will also try to
support anti-American states and actors like Venezuela
out of a desire to make money, gain influence, and
restrict U.S. flexibility and sway in world politics. It is
also increasingly likely that in the theaters we and our
allies will be fighting in during future operations, i.e.,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and conceivably elsewhere, we could
well find ourselves fighting against people armed with
Russian weapons. Nor will these be weapons bought on
politically unaffiliated world or black markets. Rather,
as in the 2002 case when Iran loaded the Karine-A ship
with large numbers of weapons bought in Russia for
terrorist operations against Israel by the Palestinian
authority, they will be weapons that Moscow
knowingly sold to “rogue states,” fully aware of their
potential future destinations. When we add Russia’s
clear support for actions to oust the United States from
its base in Kyrgyzstan and earlier from the base in
Uzbekistan, this adversarial orientation becomes even
clearer, suggesting greater Russian indifference to the
outcome of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) than
before and possibly even a measure of direct hostility
to the United States itself.318
Under the circumstances, what can we do besides
monitoring trends, drawing the appropriate conclusions, and imposing sanctions (which is what the
State Department does under U.S. law)? Like it or
not, and as Putin himself has admitted, we are in
tough competition with Russia globally. Therefore
we must be more aggressive in offering security
cooperation and weapons to allies or intersted parties
who are threatened by Russia’s exported weapons,
e.g., Southeast Asia, which has become a major focus
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of Russian attention recently, the Middle East, and
Latin America. Since Venezuela’s motive in securing
military capabilities is vastly incommensurate with any
rational need for self-defense, the weapons acquisitions
suggest offensive interests. We must therefore enhance
deterrence of such adventurism in Latin America. It is
quite likely that some of these Russian weapons will
go to insurgents or even terrorists, e.g., in Colombia
or elsewhere on that continent, so that friendly states
must be strengthened against such threats and given
the means to repel them. At the same time, we should
put Venezuela on strict notice that its expansive designs
will not be tolerated.
Perhaps the most dangerous theater where we
or our allies will encounter Russian weapons is the
Middle East. We need to strengthen deterrence against
Iran and its allies and make sure that sanctions against
ROE and other defense firms stick for a long time.
The recent fighting in Lebanon suggests the harm
such weapons can do in the hands of a well-trained
adversary, whether it is a terrorist, militia, or regular
army. Arms sales to Syria and Iran should be sanctioned
because they facilitate the continuing delivery of those
weapons to terrorists all over the region and beyond.
Moreover, such irresponsible arms sales should be
publicized broadly in an information campaign to raise
the costs to Moscow of such dealing. Greater European
awareness of these activities ultimately would impose
more costs on Moscow than is presently the case. This
information campaign should pointedly raise the issue
of whether Moscow really supports the war on terrorism
beyond its own Chechnyan problem, or is merely using
it as a pretext for free riding on the American antiterrorist horse while pursuing its own anti-American
interests. As we have often noted, one major reason
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for the current organization of ROE and the defense
industrial sector in Russia is the opportunity thereby
afforded to maximize rent-seeking. To the extent that
we multiply the tangible material and political costs
of this form of state organization, we render it ever
more dysfunctional and counterproductive over time.
While such actions to block the proliferation of Russian
conventional weapons abroad will take time to register
their effect, time works for us and against Russia in
this, if not other matters, if we will use it wisely.
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